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ABSTRACT 
 The Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014 saw a series of violent events 
leading to the ousting of then-President Yanukovych. Opposition to the revolution 
spiraled into the annexation of Crimea by Russia and ongoing skirmishes in eastern and 
southern Ukraine. Akin to the Arab Spring in 2011 that illustrated the influence of new 
media in galvanizing disparate groups to revolt against state authorities, we show that the 
analysis of sentiments through social media messages relating to the Euromaidan 
movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014 can reveal evidence of nascent plots against 
Ukrainian state authorities. We systematically examined the exonyms in native languages 
used by the groups for and against the Euromaidan movement in reference to outsider 
groups during their mobilization in Ukraine, and conducted a series of statistical tests to 
analyze the significance of social media-derived sentiment metrics in predicting violence 
across different periods of political administration in Ukraine. Our analysis of the 
Euromaidan mobilization indicates that the application of algorithms coded to detect and 
measure prevalent dissent expressed in native lexicons through social media can be used 
to substantially improve the accuracy of geospatial forecasts of violent events. 
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The fixation with the internet and social media has permeated across modern 
society, with the number of users, diversity of social media platforms, and average time 
spent on those platforms surging over recent years.1 This has inadvertently altered prior 
cultural and societal norms that impact how people interact with, and process, information. 
The advancement in information and communication technologies has provided an 
alternate channel for entities to exploit the utility of social media platforms to promulgate 
narratives, modify cognitive structures, and potentially polarize factions along lines of 
social difference.2 This phenomenon was evident during the Euromaidan Revolution in 
2014 where Ukraine’s population was fractured between pro-West and pro-Russian 
factions. The situation was exacerbated as Ukrainians broadcast their negative sentiments 
on social media, leading to increased aggression, cumulating in a series of violent events 
that led to the ousting of then-President Yanukovych. Opposition to the revolution ignited 
further clashes that spiraled into the annexation of Crimea by Russia and ongoing 
skirmishes in eastern and southern Ukraine. 
Civil unrest has historically been attributed to the state’s incapacity to exert its 
influence on the people.3 Conversely, the side that dominates the social media realm may 
potentially possess the corresponding power to manipulate the populace’s emotions. It is 
important that we unravel this enigma as social media’s extent of influence over the 
public’s interpretation of information grows exponentially. In order to avert instances 
where both local and external agents attempt to incite dissidence through various channels 
of digital propaganda, it may be wise for state governments to acknowledge the 
                                                 
1 Nic Newman, “The Rise of Social Media and Its Impact on Mainstream Journalism,” Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford (September 2009), 2. 
2 Sean Aday et al., "Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics," United States Institute of 
Peace no. 65 (August 2010), 26-27. 
3 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 12-16; Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 27-54. 
2 
significance of “soft power” and optimize its utility to monitor and influence the behavior 
of the populace. 
The impetus for our investigation is a desire to evaluate social media’s distinctive 
capacity to influence one’s convictions in order to instigate specific behavioral impulses. 
If a correlation could be drawn between the virtual propagation of public sentiments and 
the physical manifestation of violent predispositions, then state administrations can 
potentially utilize a cyber trawling algorithmic tool to closely monitor the pulse of the 
populace’s sentiments and develop accompanying policies to foster affirmative social 
expectations while mediating any potential political quagmires before the onset of 
collective violence. 
Our thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II focuses on a literature review of 
theories that illustrate the efficacy of “hard power” versus “soft power” by state authorities 
to manipulate human behavior; the mechanisms used to quantify human sentiments 
promulgated on social media through the application of specific lexicons; and new media's 
capacity to establish group identities that band like-minded individuals together, thus 
increasing the propensity toward collective violence. Chapter III delves into the power 
struggle between the Ukrainian and Russian government, the precarious complications of 
high ethnic polarization existent within Crimea and the Donbass region, as well as how 
both states exploited the utility of new media communication channels as part of their “soft 
power” strategy to further their respective political objectives, resulting in the development 
of the Euromaidan movement within Ukraine in 2014.  
Earlier thesis researchers from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have 
conducted similar experiments to establish an association between the populace’s 
sentiments and local social media linguistic trends in Yemen and Iraq.4 Their investigations 
have revealed that monitoring specific semantics propagated on Twitter can serve to predict 
                                                 
4 Andrew K. Bourret, Joshua D. Wines, and Jason M. Mendes, “Assessing Sentiment in Conflict Zones 
through Social Media” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 1-2; Harold G. Frost, Anthony 
W. Evans, and Robert H. Hodges Jr., “Understanding Violence through Social Media” (master's thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 1-2. 
3 
the propensity for violence within the corresponding region.5 To further augment the 
robustness of this field of analytics, our thesis seeks to investigate the influence of social 
media in other parts of the world experiencing similar political struggles that result in 
violent conflicts. 
In order to establish the legitimacy of our research, we adopted a similar 
quantitative approach. We coded a set of predictive algorithms to consolidate online 
propagation of dissent against the Ukrainian government in native lexicons extracted from 
Twitter data and overlaid it with a geospatial archive of violent events in Ukraine across a 
parallel time frame. We then analyzed the correlation between the volume of specific kinds 
of messages and the onset of civil violence occurring within the region across the various 
periods of state administrations, from pro-Russian to the installation of a pro-West 
administration under the leadership of President Poroshenko following the ousting of 
former President Yanukovych. Chapter IV details the research method and variables taken 
into account for our statistical models. The data consolidated to develop our algorithm 
consist of three billion messages and 40 terabytes of pre-collected Twitter data, licensed 
by NPS, between August 2013 and July 2014, which coincides with the duration of the 
Euromaidan Revolution. Through collaboration with language experts from the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI), we were able to trawl through the extensive Twitter data by 
referencing a comprehensive library of lexicons in both Russian and Ukrainian. In order to 
ascertain the veracity of the relationship between related Tweets and the occurrence of 
violent events, we further incorporated several control variables such as economic 
conditions, population density and ethnic composition within the region of study. 
Chapter V examines the results of our statistical analysis and elaborates on the key 
findings of our thesis. The Arab Spring in 2011 illustrated the influence of new media in 
galvanizing disparate groups to revolt against state authorities. Expanding the research 
outside of developing countries and incorporating new strategies for search algorithms, we 
hypothesize that the analysis of sentiments through social media data exchanges relating 
to the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014 could reveal potential plots 
                                                 
5 Frost, Evans, and Hodges Jr., 29-35. 
4 
against the Ukrainian state authority. Through the application of our algorithms, coded to 
detect and measure prevalent dissent expressed in native lexicons against the incumbent 
government in each specific political time frame, the resultant statistical models derived 
from our data analysis demonstrate a strong correlation between negative sentiments 
propagated on Twitter and the manifestation of violent events in Ukraine. 
Chapter VI summarizes the entire thesis and distills the lessons learned through the 
integration of both the conceptual and statistical analysis to understand the relationship 
between social media’s influence on people and its capacity to incite collective violence. 
Based off the insights gleaned, we then propose feasible recommendations to mitigate the 
political struggles faced in volatile regions. The inadequacies of our research and other 
potentially uncharted areas that future academics can explore within this novel field of 
research are also discussed.   
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HARD POWER VERSUS SOFT POWER 
The rise of civil violence has historically been attributed to the failure of the state 
to exert its influence on a sizeable share of the populace.6 Given the legitimacy of the state 
authority to rule, the rise of civil violence seemingly alludes to failure of the state 
authority’s ability to suppress emerging insurgency or rebellion through mechanisms of 
“hard power,” such as the power to coerce, the purchase of compliance, or the power to 
reward.7 In the coercion camp, Fearon and Laitin propose the use of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita as a proxy for the state authority’s strength, measured in terms of its 
military and its administrative and bureaucratic capacity, and contend that such measures 
of economic advancement reflect the state authority’s capacity to impose coercive force to 
deter violence.8 In the reward camp, Collier and Hoeffler claim that GDP per capita mirrors 
the economic capacity to compete directly against rebel recruitment by gaining support 
though the provision of inducements such as public services and ethnic accommodation.9 
These thoughts are fairly consistent with leading literature in international relations and 
                                                 
6 Kalyvas, 12-16; Tilly, 27-54. 
7 Hanne Fjelde and Indra De Soysa, “Coercion, Co-Optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the 
Risk of Civil War, 1961—2004,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 1 (February 2009), 6–
11, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894208097664; James D. Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil 
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 2005), 483–487, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277544; Hanne Fjelde, “Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil 
War, 1985—99,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 2 (March 2009), 199–204, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100715; Macartan Humphreys, “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict 
Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 2005), 510–
513, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277545; Bertram H. Raven, “The Bases of Power and the 
Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 8, no. 1 
(December 2008), 1–4. 
8 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), 75-76, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534. 
9 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46, no. 1 (February 2002), 15–17, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046001002; Jean-Paul Azam, 
“How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries,” Public 
Choice 83, no. 1–2 (April 1995), 174–176; Jean-Paul Azam and Alice Mesnard, “Civil War and the Social 
Contract,” Public Choice 115, no. 3-4 (June 2003), 456–457; Halvard Buhaug, “Relative Capability and 
Rebel Objective in Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 6 (November 2006), 695–697; Jennifer 
Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships,” Economics 
& Politics 18, no. 1 (March 2006), 14–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x. 
6 
political sociology pitching “hard power” as the means to repress the emergence of civil 
violence.10 However, looking beyond the implicit assumption that this collapsed capacity 
is highly correlated with GDP per capita, the generalization of military, administrative and 
bureaucratic capacities into a single state capacity indicator can neither reveal the 
operational efficiency of the individual components nor equate the authority’s success to 
any particular mechanism of “hard power.”11  
Compliance of the local populace could also be secured through “soft power.” 
Originally conceptualized by Carr as “propaganda power” and akin to what Lukes termed 
as the “third dimension” of power, Nye and Raven suggest that political leaders could 
transpose their values, beliefs and interests through carefully scripted narratives in tune 
with traditional norms and practices that seek to influence the behavior of the collective 
populace.12 In other words, political messaging through communication channels “work 
essentially as persuasive historical stories that prompt people to embrace the valorized 
identities, play the stirring roles, and have fulfilling experiences that political leaders strive 
                                                 
10 Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (March 1993), 28–
29, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672; Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to 
Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (April 1996), 164–166, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539045; 
James D. Fearon, "Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War," Institutions and Economic 
Performance 292 (May 2007), 14-15; Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 
Authority and Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 13-14; Jeffrey Herbst, “African 
Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and Combat Effectiveness,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (May 1, 2004), 357–358, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043774; Tilly, 27-54; Christian 
Davenport, “State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 4 (July 2007), 
487–488, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078940; Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political 
Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1 (May 2007), 2–8, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216. 
11 Cullen S. Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study 
of Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (May 2010), 274; Timothy C. Warren, “Not by the 
Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty,” International 
Organization 68, no. 1 (January 2014), 114. 
12 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 120-134; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London and 
New York: Macmillian, 1974), 109-110; Steven Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” 
Millennium 33, no. 3 (June 2005), 486–487, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031201; Joseph S. Nye, 
“Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (October 1990), 167–68, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580; James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), 959–963; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power 
of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 6-8; Bertram H. Raven, “Political Applications of the Psychology of Interpersonal Influence 
and Social Power,” Political Psychology 11, no. 3 (September 1990), 495–497, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3791662. 
7 
to evoke for them, whether through arguments, rhetoric, symbols, or stories of a more 
obvious and familiar sort.”13 With the success of “soft power,” the necessity of mechanisms 
such as coercion and reward can be a moot point. This, in turn, could enhance the 
legitimacy of the authority and quash any uprising attempts at the onset.14 Failure, on the 
other hand, could require the co-opting of “hard power” mechanisms to maintain control, 
and worst, reinvigorate the rebellion to rise and wrestle control of the populace from the 
state authority. 
In their analysis of insurgent conflicts, Leites and Wolf suggest that the rise of a 
rebellion can be distinguished by two stages: a formative stage and an advanced stage.15 
At its formative stage, the insurgents are confined by both the resources available — 
people, arms, money, information, etc.—and the accompanying operating space. 
Resources will need to be replenished to fund (or at the minimum sustain) the insurgent’s 
activities so as to lay the conditions for the insurgency to grow bigger and progress toward 
the advanced stage over time. The insurgent group needs to leverage its sole position of 
strength over the state authority at the onset: its relative control of the information domain 
with regard to its plans and activities. The growing success of one group against the state 
authority could motivate and trigger follow-on conflicts by other aggrieved groups in the 
near vicinity.16 The efficient utilization of this information superiority over the state 
authority would not only ensure the survival and growth of the insurgent group but also 
erode the relative material strength of the state authority over time. On the contrary, should 
                                                 
13 Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44-45. 
14 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 65-68; Margaret Levi, “Why We Need a New Theory of Government,” Perspectives on Politics 4, 
no. 1 (March 2006), 6-7, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592706060038; Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in 
International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 2 (April 1999), 388–389; Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 8-10; David 
A. Lake, “Relational Authority and Legitimacy in International Relations,” American Behavioral Scientist 
53, no. 3 (November 2009), 332–333, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209338796. 
15 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts, No. RAND-R-462-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA:RAND, 1970), 51, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/705020.pdf. 
16 Nils-Christian Bormann and Jesse Hammond, “A Slippery Slope: The Domestic Diffusion of Ethnic 
Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 4 (December 2016), 589–591, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw031. 
8 
the state authority be successful in achieving information parity or more, it could bring to 
bear its relative material strength to rid the insurgent group completely. The earlier the 
authority can negate its information weakness, the lesser the cost of resource commitment 
to eliminate the insurgent group. Hence, one would reach the conclusion that insurgent 
groups should communicate their intent covertly, while the state authority should invest 
resources into information and intelligence networks to foil the communication networks 
of potential insurgent groups, ideally during the latter’s formative stage before the onset of 
violence. 
Separately, Leites and Wolf observe that the corresponding control effected by the 
authority could reduce the endogenous supply of resources funding the insurgent growth.17 
What is undiscussed, however, is how the potential influence by an external actor could 
upset the pre-exiting balance between the authority and the insurgent group, and tilt the 
balance in favor of the insurgent group. Leveraging on their information superiority to 
conduct pre-emptive actions and aided by the forward deployment of Russian troops and 
equipment, pro-Russian separatists were able to take control of Crimea with minimal force 
in less than a month, leading to the annexation of Crimea by Russia on March 18, 2014. 
Akin to Russian intervention in Transnistria in the 1990s, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in 2008, the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing skirmishes in eastern Ukraine reflect 
how quickly the control authority can change with external support funding the growth of 
an internal uprising.18  
B. INFLUENCE OF NEW MEDIA 
Cultural and societal norms shape how the populace behaves and sees the world. 
Warren establishes that increases in mass media penetration reduce civil violence; hence, 
the effective use of state-controlled media should provide the state authority with a relative 
                                                 
17 Leites and Wolf, 71–89. 
18 Uri Friedman, “Putin’s Playbook: The Strategy Behind Russia’s Takeover of Crimea,” The Atlantic, 
last modified March 2, 2014,  http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/putins-playbook-the-
strategy-behind-russias-takeover-of-crimea/284154/; Lucy Ash, “How Russia Outfoxes Its Enemies,” BBC 
News, last modified January 29, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283/. 
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advantage over activist groups in the information domain.19 However, the advancement in 
information and communication technologies has threatened to upset the existing balance. 
Societal stability within a country relies intimately upon the government’s capacity to 
assert and maintain its legitimacy over its designated political sphere.20 Even despotic 
regimes with absolute control over the country could be susceptible to possible exploitation 
of new media by activist groups—already bonded locally by strong ties and shared 
norms—to polarize like-minded distant factions along social differences and instigate 
bigotry through brokerage via selected social platforms.21 Perceived aggression by the state 
authority against one or more activist “out-groups” may elevate its importance and 
salience, triggering other like-minded distant activist groups that identify themselves as 
part of the larger “collective in-group identity” to adopt more polarizing and extreme 
views, potentially leading to the plotting and execution of violent activities in defense of 
the imagined group identity.22 
Upon the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, the Arab world witnessed a massive 
surge of civil protests that led to violent confrontations within authoritarian states, thereby 
shifting the region’s political environment.23 Social media platforms served an essential 
function during the turmoil, connecting foreign patrons intimately with indigenous plight 
through real-time digital uploads.24 Consequently, there has been an increasing consensus 
on the significance of the role that new media plays in galvanizing disenchanted youth in 
                                                 
19 Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 118–121. 
20 Timothy C. Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (May 2015), 297, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314558102. 
21 Sean Aday et al., "Blogs and Bullets," 26-27. 
22 Marc Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2016), 98-100; Cass R. Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization,” Journal of Political Philosophy 10, no. 
2 (June 2002), 177–178, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9760.00148. 
23 Sean Aday et al., "New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring," United States Institute of 
Peace no. 80 (July 2012), 3. 
24 Sean Aday et al., “New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring," 3. 
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particular, and inspiring uprising sentiments through the rampant propagation of 
information on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.25 
In an investigation conducted by Pierskalla and Hollenbach, they found a 
statistically substantiated relationship between the availability of mobile communication 
and level of organized violence.26 They contend that the introduction of mobile 
communication into Africa alleviated organizational complications faced by activist 
groups, thus enhancing their ability to coordinate and carry out organized violence against 
the incumbent government.27 This led them to conclude that the utility of new media, 
through the endemic spread and connectivity of modern mobile technology to promulgate 
information, eases the process of inciting communal conflict and exacerbating organized 
violence.28 In addition, depending on how either side exploits the utility of mobile 
communications, it can potentially embolden activists to engage in more hostilities, or 
reinforce the government’s control over the population through pre-emptive surveillance 
and intervention of potential political threats.29 Pierskalla and Hollenbach argue that the 
increasing availability of affordable and widespread communication in an underdeveloped 
Africa enable people to spontaneously promulgate their sentiments, even within repressive 
regimes, which engenders mutual trust and heightens awareness amongst group members, 
fulfilling the prerequisites to rapidly garner mass support for a common cause, and easing 
coordination efforts for collective violence across multiple locations.30 
                                                 
25 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power: A 
Memoir (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 63. 
26 Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell 
Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review 107 no. 2 (May 
2013), 208. 
27 Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 208; Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent 
Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 131. 
28 Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 208; Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar 
Republic,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (April 1997), 426-427. 
29 Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 209; Steven Livingston, Africa's Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to 
Security and Stability, Research Paper no. 2 (National Defense University Washington DC Africa Center 
for Strategic Studies, March 2011), 23; Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, "Is the Phone Mightier 
than the Sword? Cellphones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq." International Organization 69, no. 2 (April 
2015), 5-6. 
30 Pierskalla and Hollenbach, 210-211; Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing 
Without Organizations (New York: Penguin, 2008), 51. 
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In related research, Warren reinforced Pierskalla and Hollenbach’s findings by  
illustrating how the extent of traditional mass media and new social media penetration 
could impact the populace’s propensity for violence, particularly in regions lacking in 
traditional infrastructure—television, radio and printed press—where social media is more 
readily accessible due to the cheap proliferation of cell phones.31 Therefore, developing 
countries necessitate their political authorities to be more cognizant of social media 
penetration, because it increases the populace’s susceptibility to engage in violent activism 
when they are incapable of providing a uniform distribution of government services and 
influence throughout the entire region due to the lack of modern communication 
infrastructure.32 Warren argues that the state and its political opponents are constantly 
engaged in a contest to expand their influence through different avenues of communication; 
the state relies on mass communication media to traverse social enclaves in an attempt to 
establish vertical relationships with the populace by publicly broadcasting a consistent 
narrative of unity and trust, while its political opponents exploit social media platforms for 
their capacity to establish multiple  horizontal relationships with segregated audiences in 
order to proliferate contentious propaganda which may incite violent activism.33 
Whether new media incites divisions between groups of people with differing 
beliefs—by establishing segregated avenues where people reinforce their convictions 
through the selective promulgation of bigoted narratives—or that its effect is 
inconsequential to the larger political agenda is debatable.34 The Blogs and Bullets report 
investigates the contrasting opinions on the significance of new media in recent conflicts. 
One faction credits new media for advocating democracy and capitalism, exemplified by 
Twitter’s efficacy during the Iranian Green Movement in 2009, while the opposing faction 
condemns new media for aggravating violence in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and 
                                                 
31 Warren, "Explosive Connections,” 298. 
32 Warren, "Explosive Connections,” 300; Kalyvas, 12-16. 
33 Warren, "Explosive connections,” 300-301; Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, A Social History of the 
Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 101-120.  
34 Cass R. Sunstein, “Neither Hayek nor Habermas,” Public Choice 134, no. 1-2 (January 2008), 92–
94; Michael Gerson, “Banish the Cyber-Bigots,” Washington Post, last modified September 25, 2009, 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092403932.html. 
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the Czech Republic, where despotic governments exploit information technologies to 
subjugate the population under strict surveillance.35  
C. MEASURING SENTIMENTS VIA NEW MEDIA 
The immense accumulation of internet data and increasing capability of big data 
analytics present an unprecedented opportunity to analyze the available data and reveal 
obscured networks and unexpected relationships through social profiles and patterns. 36 
Warren asserts that before the fruition of organized violence can occur, the antagonistic 
political narratives have to first be promulgated effectively in order to garner popular 
support from the masses.37 This alludes to the prospect of foreseeing potential outbreaks 
of political violence by detecting rising trends of vindictive propaganda through social 
communication platforms.38 Extending along this trajectory, social media platforms 
present an alternative avenue for researchers to comprehend and quantify the complex 
psyche of humans, and evaluate one’s hypotheses on new media’s impact on inciting 
political violence.39 However, it is quintessential to note the anonymity, ambiguity, and 
restrictive representation of the extracted data for the analysis of new media, as online data 
are often saturated with distorted information propagated by agents or programs with 
vested interests, or presented in foreign languages and slangs which require contextual 
                                                 
35 Mark Pfeifle, "A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?" The Christian Science Monitor, last modified July 6, 
2009, https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0706/p09s02-coop.html; Joe Powell, “Amid 
Censorship and Threats Ugandans Turn to New Media,” The Independent, last modified September 23, 
2009, https://www.independent.co.ug/amid-censorship-threats-ugandans-turn-new-media/; Joshua 
Goldstein and Juliana Rotich, "Digitally Networked Technology in Kenya’s 2007–2008 Post-Election 
Crisis," Berkman Center Research Publication 9 (September 2008), 4-5. 
36 Sean Aday et al., “New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring," 5. 
37 Timothy C. Warren, “The Technology of Statecraft in the Age of Social Media: Idioms of Authority 
and Radicalization in Nigeria Social Communication,” in Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, 2016, 3. 
38 Warren, “The Technology of Statecraft in the Age of Social Media,” 3. 
39 Warren, “The Technology of Statecraft in the Age of Social Media,” 6. 
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interpretations and potentially preclude people in developing regions with limited access 
to the internet.40  
In their research, Bourret, Wines, and Mendes geo-referenced massive amounts of 
Twitter data to obtain approximate locations of relevant feeds in Yemen, before compiling 
an archive of lexicons to measure the intensity of sentiments represented by each related 
post.41 Subsequently, Bourret, Wines, and Mendes framed their algorithms to develop data 
sets that quantify the level of support for the government versus that for the violent 
activists.42 Further studies conducted recently on new media focuses on developing a 
predictive algorithm to detect prevalent dissent, in the absence of credible physical 
intelligence, through data analytics in order to provide early warning for the political 
authority.43 Frost, Evans, and Hodges Jr. utilized native Arabic lexicons extracted from 
local social media platforms to anticipate violence within Iraq so as to enhance the 
government’s situational awareness.44 The set of identified lexicons were then 
systematically assigned values across a scale to quantify the strength of the sentiment it 
exudes. Subsequently, the dataset was overlaid onto a geospatial archive of violent 
activities across a parallel time frame in order to ascertain its relationship with negative 
sentiments broadcasted on social media. 
Previous studies in this novel field have gathered great insights by analyzing a wide 
array of social, political, and technological variables, in an attempt to reveal the enigmatic 
influence new media has on modern society, and to determine the latent conditions within 
a country that serve as catalysts to incite collective violence through the dissemination of 
negative sentiments. This research focused primarily in the Middle East and Africa region 
                                                 
40 Stephen Ansolabehere and Eitan Hersh, “Validation: What Big Data Reveal About Survey 
Misreporting and the Real Electorate,” Political Analysis 20, no. 4 (June 2012), 439-441; Pablo Barberá 
and Gonzalo Rivero, “Understanding the Political Representativeness of Twitter Users,” Social Science 
Computer Review 33, no. 6 (December 2015), 717. 
41 Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, 20. 
42 Bourret, Wines, and Mendes, 20-21. 
43 Frost, Evans, and Hodges Jr., 1. 
44 Frost, Evans, and Hodges Jr., 10. 
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where inter-group violence has ostensibly proliferated since the introduction of new media 
and the increasing accessibility of communication infrastructure and mobile devices. 
Our thesis endeavors to augment earlier studies by taking an innovative approach 
to analyze a different set of variables and determine its correlation with the manifestation 
of collective violence in an alternative region. Ukraine and Russia share an enduring, but 
contentious history, resulting in a constant and fierce struggle for political power in their 
border territories. The resentment between polarized local ethnic groups culminated in the 
outbreak of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013 and 2014. 
In order to quantify the significance of social media in this predicament, we 
systematically examined the exonyms, unique terms which are conceived by an individual 
ethnic group in their local dialect to reference other groups explicitly, and cross-examined 
them with publications on new media channels as well as historical symbols, myths and 
norms. We then sorted the list of search terms under either pro- or anti-Euromaidan 
movement categories. Notably, only terms that qualify exclusively as exonyms during the 
duration of the Euromaidan movement were filtered out. Subsequently, in order to 
substantiate our research, we conducted a series of data analytics on the Twitter archive 
using the consolidated list of search terms to analyze the significance of negative tweets in 
rousing violence across different periods of administration in Ukraine. Lastly, we revised 
the selection of control variables to incorporate not only the traditional components of 
“hard power” such as GDP, but more importantly, elements of “soft power” encompassing 
the degree of ethnic polarization to generate a more robust and significant statistical model 
for our thesis.
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III. BACKGROUND: UKRAINE 
The Arab Spring seemed to take the world by storm in 2011 illustrated the influence 
of new media in galvanizing disparate groups to revolt against state authorities. General 
Gerasimov opines that these events represent how mainstream warfare would be contested 
going forward, and that the military has to consider the use of non-military means, 
including foreign intervention through the use of information, to advance national interests 
and attain strategic goals.45 
In his address to Russian ambassadors recalled to Moscow in attendance of a 
meeting to review Russian foreign policy priorities in July 2004, President Putin suggested 
the establishment of information and cultural centers as a means to protect the interests and 
rights of ethnic Russians residing in the Commonwealth of Independent States—former 
Soviet Republics and neighboring states—and Baltic countries.46 Reinforced with Russia’s 
belief that it is constantly under siege from subversive acts from non-aligned opponents, 
Russia invests all instruments of power to enhance its security and interests.47 The 
expansion in membership for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the mid-1990s 
with considerations to admit Georgia and Ukraine, and the European Union’s integration 
of Ukraine under its Eastern Partnership initiative as a prelude to Ukraine’s entrance to the 
Union, only served to enhance the insecurities of Russia. 48 The Russian identity narrative 
and its accompanying hopes of securing Ukraine’s participation in the Eurasian Customs 
Union were under threat. These fueled Russia’s motivations for the construction of what 
                                                 
45 Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking 
the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January 2016), 
24–25. 
46 Fiona Hill, “Moscow Discovers Soft Power,” Current History 105, no. 693 (October 2006), 341–
342. 
47 Stephen Blank, “Cyber War and Information War à la Russe,” Understanding Cyber Conflict: 14 
Analogies (November 2017), 82-85.  
48 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That 
Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (October 9, 2014), 78–80. 
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Feklyunina coined the “’Russia World’—an imagined community based on markers of the 
Russian language, the Russian culture and the common glorious past.”49  
The ideological struggle in Ukraine presents a classic battleground to analyze the 
strategies of both Western and Russian influence since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Over eight million ethnic Russians—approximately 17% of the total population, the second 
largest group in Ukraine—live predominantly in eastern and southern Ukraine (see Figure 
1), and many are strong believers in maintaining the links between countries of East Slavic 
descent.50 On the other hand, ethnic Ukrainians accounting for majority of the country's 
population, are dispersed across central, northern and western Ukraine (see Figure 2). 
Juxtaposing the census of these two principal ethnic groups, we were able to identify the 
regions within Ukraine that possess the greatest ethnic polarization (see Figure 3). These 
two main ethnic groups often delineate themselves by differing political ideologies, leading 
to much contention within the country. Therefore, it was not surprising to observe a spike 
in violent events within regions with high ethnic polarity during the peak of the 
Euromaidan Revolution. 
 
                                                 
49 Valentina Feklyunina, “Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian World(s)',” 
European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 4 (December 2016), 791, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066115601200. 
50 Mikhail A. Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations 






Figure 1. Ethnic Russian Population in Ukraine.51 
 
Figure 2. Ethnic Ukrainian Population in Ukraine.52 
                                                 
51 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001, (accessed Jun 6, 2018), 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/; Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset, Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.1. 
52 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
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Figure 3. Ethnic Polarization of Population in Ukraine.53 
The government of Ukraine and ethnic Ukrainians living in Ukraine, however, 
remain divided over this issue, leading to the impasse today.54 According to independent 
polls conducted in 2015, 56% of Ukrainians living outside of Crimea and the Donbass 
region—comprising Donetsk and Luhansk—were keen to negotiate an agreement with the 
pro-Russian separatists to cease the violence, while ethnic Russians generally prefer the 
Donbass region to either become independent states (35%) or part of Russia (24%), rather 
than staying with Ukraine (34%).55 This could be the mandate that President Putin and his 
administration had wanted to support the ongoing conflicts in eastern Ukraine. 
The Soviet military is alleged to have researched the practice of reflexive control, 
a form of psychological "programming"—defined by Thomas as “a means of conveying to 
a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make 
the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action”—since the 1960s, with 
                                                 
53 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
54 Molchanov, 59-62. 
55 Jacob Poushter, “Key Findings from our Polls on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” Pew Research 
Center, last modified June 10, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/10/key-findings-from-
our-poll-on-the-russia-ukraine-conflict/. 
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its application extended by Russia to both internal and external politics.56 Besides the 
diplomatic, economic and military maneuvers adopted by Russia, a study of Russia and 
pro-Russian separatists’ usage of lexicons on social media platforms as part of its 
information campaign to orchestrate civil unrest in Ukraine during the Euromaidan 
movement in 2013-2014 could glean useful lessons for states weary of external influence. 
Specifically, the development of a predictive methodology and its accompanying coded 
algorithms could detect and measure prevalent networks circulating dissent against state 
authority through data analytics of new media, which in turn could facilitate the adoption 
of effective early actions by the state authority to neutralize both internal and external 
influence of the populace to incite violence. 
New media, such as social platforms like Twitter, present a potential 
communication channel that could be exploited by activist groups for both internal and 
external communication. While Twitter is not the most pervasive social media platform 
globally, we hypothesized that the distinctive attributes that Twitter offers enhances its 
propensity to solicit instantaneous, concise and true sentiments from its users, thereby 
enabling us to conduct a more accurate analysis through the tracking of hashtags and online 
trends. Populated by billions of tweets posted by users world-wide, the intended meaning 
of trending messages could be erroneously interpreted through the use of lexicons, and 
eventually distorted as it disseminates from one user to another. This underlines the 
importance for the state authority to invest resources in gaining a foothold in 
communication channels, such as social media platforms, that can be utilized by activists 
to coordinate and incite violence. Once the baseline predictive methodology and algorithm 
are developed, it could be scaled and adapted accordingly to any communication channel 
to measure sentiments for and against the state authority, including influence from external 
state and non-state actors.  
Empirical research on the use of new media to coordinate and incite civil violence 
has focused predominantly on the contest between local activist groups and the state 
                                                 
56 Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies 17, no. 2 (June 2004), 238-239, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040490450529. 
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authority of less developed countries in Africa and the Middle East. This thesis aims to 
reveal potential plots against the state authority, and glean useful lessons on the utility of 
social media in predicting violence, with or without foreign intervention, through the 
analysis of sentiments found in social media data exchanges relating to the Euromaidan 
movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014.
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IV. RESEARCH METHODS 
Making sense of new media’s ability to provoke and manipulate social behavior 
entails a quantitative approach that sifts through vast amounts of open source data available 
online to identify networks that produce civil unrest within a specified region. Such studies, 
especially analytics adopted to measure sentiments, are still in a nascent stage and have 
been applied almost exclusively to less developed countries in Africa and the Middle East. 
An extension and adaptation of earlier methodologies to measure sentiments incited from 
both exogenous and endogenous sources in Ukraine could reveal further evidence of the 
utility of social media in generating collective violence and lend weight to the hypothesis 
that the analysis of new media could predict the onset of civil violence. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
We hypothesize that the analysis of sentiments through social media data exchanges 
relating to the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014 could reveal potential 
plots against the Ukrainian state authority. To validate the claim, predictive algorithms are 
coded to detect and measure prevalent dissent against the Ukrainian government in native 
lexicons extracted from Twitter data and overlaid with a geospatial archive of violent 
events in Ukraine across a parallel time frame in to ascertain its relationship with negative 
sentiments broadcasted on Twitter. 
The Euromaidan movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014 saw the change of state 
administration from pro-Russian—under the helm of then-President Yanukovych till 
February 21, 2014—to one that is pro-West—under the leadership of President Poroshenko 
effective May 25, 2014 till the time of this writing—with an interim government leaning 
towards the West in power between the two periods. We hypothesize that anti-Euromaidan 
sentiments incite violence while pro-Euromaidan sentiments reduce violence during the 
window of analysis under the interim government which is pro-West, while only anti-
Euromaidan sentiments will continue to trigger conflict under President Poroshenko's 
administration. We came to this deduction because we believe that both factions had a 
vested interest in jostling for political power during the interim administrative period as 
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the exodus of President Yanukovych inadvertently created a power vacuum in Ukraine. 
Subsequently, after President Poroshenko took office and enacted pro-West policies, it is 
comprehensible that the pro-Russian faction would raise the ante in an attempt to regain 
their influence. Lastly, we intentionally omitted the data analysis during President 
Yanukovych's regime as there were insufficient violent events during this period to 
generate adequate tests of our hypotheses.  
B. DATA AND METHODS 
Collecting the relevant data for our research was a complicated process due to 
various obstacles. Not only were there regulated access to digital information on social 
media platforms, it was also challenging to ascertain the veracity of digital information. 
More importantly, our limited linguistic proficiency, as well as the lack of local context, 
may potentially distort our understanding of the lexicons used. Nonetheless, we made our 
best effort to consolidate the relevant data sets and designed appropriate analytical methods 
for our research. 
1. Social Media 
The data used in the analysis are derived from pre-collected Twitter data from 
August 2013 to July 2014, comprising three billion messages and 40 terabytes of data in 
total, licensed by NPS. In order to distill the extensive data and confine it to Ukraine and 
Russia, we utilized the geographical coordinates of each user’s self-proclaimed hometown 
in their public user profile. A more accurate calibration, employing the GPS coordinates 
tagged to each Tweet, was not implemented for our quantitative analysis because of the 
insignificant population of Twitter users who have given permission for Twitter to track 
and record their physical location. Consequently, we traded a tolerable diminution in 
geographical precision for a significant increase in volume of Twitter data. 
Despite the diverse array of social media platforms that are relevant to this study, 
such as Facebook, which undisputedly has the largest user population globally and hosts 
innumerably higher data traffic, we chose Twitter for its more pertinent attributes. Twitter’s 
facile and unrestricted user interface not only encourages its users to promulgate their 
genuine sentiments instantaneously in response to a specific stimulus, but more 
23 
importantly, allows unacquainted users to affiliate with others who share similar opinions 
through the application of hashtags. In addition, Twitter’s 140 characters limitation 
compels its users to convey their sentiments concisely, diminishing the prospect of 
ambiguous Tweets that may distort the veracity of the study. Last but not least, a unique 
attribute that distinguishes Twitter apart from other social media platforms is the 
availability of information on its users' geographic metadata through their home profile, 
thus enabling us to geospatially determine the location of the tweets and correlate them 
with the occurrence of violent events.  
2. Dissent Lexicon
People commonly disregard formal writing conventions, favoring their own native 
jargons, dialect or even emoticons, when conveying their sentiments via social media.57 
The crux of our research hinges on the ability to decipher these foreign linguistic variants 
in order to establish their true intent. Fortunately, Ms. Marina Cobb, a Subject Matter 
Expert (SME) faculty member from the Defense Language Institute (DLI), provided the 
requisite Russian lexicon terms—perceived to be related to the Euromaidan movement—
on which the search terms are ran over tweets, hashtags and uniform resource locators 
(URLs). These Russian lexicon terms are derived from the SME’s knowledge of the 
Russian language, her familiarity on the issues of social-cultural and lingual identities and 
language policies during Euromaidan and ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflicts, and cross-
referencing with reports from both traditional and new media. Similarly, Ms. Tanya Clark, 
also a SME faculty member from the DLI, provided the requisite Ukrainian lexicon terms. 
However, an unintended constraint of our analysis is that it only captures a 
particular social stratum within the entire population. The demographics of social media 
users consist primarily of affluent and younger city dwellers.58 Poor people living in rural 
57 Nora Al-Twairesh, Hend Al-Khalifa and AbdulMalik Al-Salman, “AraSenTi: Large-Scale Twitter-
Specific Arabic Sentiment Lexicons,” in Proceedings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers), vol. 1, (August 2016), 697; Frost, Evans, and Hodges 
Jr., 18. 
58 Barberá and Rivero, 717; Alan Mislove et al., “Understanding the Demographics of Twitter Users,” 
in Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media 11, no. 5 (July 
2011), 555-556.  
24 
areas often lack funds and infrastructure that supports internet connectivity, and older 
residents are generally less conversant with modern technology. Nevertheless, we aspire to 
derive a comprehensive algorithm that is capable of measuring dissent that extends 
indiscriminately across all ages and regions. 
Another concern we had was the potential of incorporating false positives into our 
regression results with our rudimentary data scraping technique that primarily detects 
specific lexicons within a predefined dictionary, with limited capacity to distinguish the 
varying semantics in which they were delivered. Nevertheless, our team’s extensive 
research suggests that the lexicons identified were contextually consistent across all forms 
of digital media propagation, indicating that the occurrence of such cases would be too rare 
to appreciably impact the veracity of our results. 
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In order to develop the thesis, it was imperative to trawl through relevant databases 
and tabulate an accurate count of the number of violent events and Euromaidan-related 
tweets. Consequently, we conducted a geospatial analysis on both variables to determine 
the correlation between them. The detailed methodology of our regression analysis is 
illustrated below. 
1. Regression Model
A Poisson regression model was designated for the statistical analysis so as to 
compute the most precise assessment between August 2013 to July 2014. Specifically, the 
unit of analysis for the regression model was set at the Grid-Cell level, with a grid-cell 
width of approximately 20 kilometers, cumulating to 2041 cells in total. This method of 
analysis divides Ukraine's entire territory into regular grid squares, with each side aligning 
to 0.2° of the earth's longitude and latitude, equating to an approximately 14 x 14 miles for 
each cell. This level of resolution offers a balance between providing adequate fidelity in 
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delineating Ukraine’s border, while being comprehensive enough to capture sufficient 
observations for our regression model analysis. 
The independent variables chosen were pro- and anti-Euromaidan content within 
tweets (see Appendices A and B), while demographic data that accounts for GDP per 
capita—GDP and population density—were used as control variables to address a common 
critique that “hard power” is a better predictor of civil violence than “soft power.” Another 
control variable selected was the total number of tweets in Ukraine during the period of 
analysis to account for the influence of total message volume vis-à-vis the tweets 
containing Euromaidan-related sentiments. Last but not least, we also controlled for the 
ethnic distribution of the populace as an overwhelming presence of a particular ethnic 
group within a region may plausibly affect how they interact with provocative propaganda 
on social media, thus skewing the prospect of violence. 
A set of predictive algorithms were coded to detect and measure prevalent dissent 
against the Ukrainian government in native Russian lexicons extracted from Twitter data 
and overlaid with a geospatial archive of violent events in Ukraine across a parallel time 
frame in to ascertain its relationship with negative sentiments broadcasted on Twitter. The 
Euromaidan movement in Ukraine from 2013 to 2014 saw the change of state 
administration from pro-Russian—under the helm of then-President Yanukovych till 
February 21, 2014—to one that is pro-West—under the leadership of President Poroshenko 
effective May 25, 2014 till the point of writing—with an interim government leaning 
towards the West in power in between. We built our regression models to examine the 
latter 2 time frames in order to evaluate social media's correlation with violent events in 
each distinctive political climate. 
2. Dependent Variable 
We sourced our data on the timing and location of civil violence events in Ukraine 
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED) 
Global Version 18.1 (2017). The UCDP is a leading research organization in archiving 
violent events in order to assist researchers and decision makers with a comprehensive and 
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systematic dataset on organized violence globally.59 The UCDP GED dataset tracks 
143,617 violent events where either government forces or another organized entity, strike 
against another organized actor or civilians, causing at least one fatality at a specific time 
and place, and between January 1, 1989 and  December 31, 2017.60 
By geo-referencing the deadly events and fatality counts between 2013 and 2014 
in Ukraine, we were able to generate heat maps to illustrate the violence and death density 
in each grid cell (see Figures 4 and 5). This enables us to identify regions of interest for 
our research that may impact our hypothesis testing. We observed no significant organized 
violence recorded in Crimea despite its annexation by Russia. Instead, the majority of the 
deadly events occurred within the Donbass region, while the rest of Ukraine largely 
remained peaceful during the turbulent periods of the Euromaidan Revolution. However, 
the models generated do not incorporate an analysis on the escalation of violence preceding 
the deadly event as the datasets do not include instances of protests or confrontations 
without an associated report on fatal casualties. 
                                                 
59 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research Database (accessed 
August 13, 2018), http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/about-ucdp/. 
60 Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset," Journal 
of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (July 2013), 524-525; Mihai Croicu and Ralph Sundberg, “UCDP GED 




Figure 4. Deadly Events in Ukraine (Grid-Cell).61 
 
Figure 5. Total Deaths in Ukraine (Grid-Cell).62 
                                                 
61 Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset," Journal 






62 Sundberg and Melander, "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset." 
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3. Independent Variable 
We decided to utilize Twitter feeds in both the Russian and Ukrainian languages 
stored within the NPS Twitter Archive, between the time period of August 1, 2013 to  July 
31, 2014, as the independent variable for our thesis. The archive holds a massive 40 
terabyte collation of a 10% random sample of all tweets posted during this time frame. 
Applying the library of both Russian and Ukrainian lexicons, which were catalogued under 
either pro- or anti-Euromaidan classifications depending on the context of the message 
which they were sourced from, we trawled through the Twitter archive in the attempt to 
measure the level of public dissent in Ukraine. This corroborates the analysis between the 
populace’s sentiments in relation to the occurrence of violent events. 
Through the illustrations generated (see Figures 6 and 7), we were able to establish 
that the highest concentration of tweets transmitted in Ukraine centered around Kyiv. This 
is possibly due to the large aggregation of politically savvy population situated in the 
capital of the country. The other focal point which accounts for a high density of Twitter 
feeds is the Donbass region where the conflict is most intense near the border between 
Ukraine and Russia. Lastly, we observed a sporadic distribution of Twitter volume across 
municipalities around the country despite the lack of organized violence. This may imply 
that the influence of social media is not limited by geographical proximity and can impact 
the propensity for violence in a distant region by propagating grievances through tweets. 
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Figure 6. Maidan-Related Tweets in Russian (Grid-Cell). 
 
Figure 7. Maidan-Related Tweets in Ukrainian (Grid-Cell).  
4. Control Variables 
a. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDP Per Capita) 
GDP is commonly used to assess a state’s agility to develop its military, 
administrative and bureaucratic capacities, so as to control its people through “hard 
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power.”63 With access to more resources, governments can undermine their adversaries in 
the contest for political control by either gaining public support though the provision of 
public services and infrastructure, or coercing citizens into compliance through reinforced 
policing.64 However, by further taking into account population density, we are able to 
evaluate GDP Per Capita across all regions in Ukraine to have a better understanding of 
the relationship between the distribution of wealth and the people’s susceptibility to 
violence. The assumption is that regions with high GDP Per Capita are more peaceful as 
people are leading better quality lives, and thus have less motivation to manifest their 
grievances while areas of low GDP Per Capita have insufficient resources to placate the 
needs of the people, thus leading to an increased desire to change the status quo. 
We chose GDP Per Capita as one of our experiment’s control variable in order to 
counteract any impact of “hard power” on the people. The data was obtained from the G-
Econ Project, a publicly available geographically-based economic database compiled by 
Prof William Nordhaus at Yale University. 65 We extracted the economic and population 
data provided in the G-Econ data set, and divided them based on their geospatial tags to 
identify the mean GDP Per Capita of each grid cell within Ukraine’s borders (see Figure 
8). From the diagrams generated, we can observe that the northern regions of Ukraine are 
more affluent than the rest of the nation. Despite the southern and western districts being 
more impoverished, there is an absence of deadly events in those corresponding areas. On 
the contrary, the moderately prosperous Donbass region witnessed the highest density of 
fatal events. However, this phenomenon was not replicated in the other affluent regions. 
Therefore, the inverse relationship between economic conditions and propensity for 
violence is seemingly ambiguous in Ukraine. 
                                                 
63 Fearon and Laitin, 80-81. 
64 Collier and Hoeffler, 15–17; Jean-Paul Azam, 174–176; Azam and Mesnard, 456–457; Halvard 
Buhaug, 695–697; Gandhi and Przeworski, 14–15. 




Figure 8. Mean GDP Per Capita in Ukraine (Grid-Cell).66 
b. Ethnicity 
The All-Ukrainian Population Census, scheduled approximately once every ten 
years, produces a comprehensive series of statistics of the Ukrainian population. It accounts 
for 48.5 million people situated over 24 administrative regions and 2 special status cities.67 
Specifically, we focused on the documentation of the various nationalities and ethnic 
groups residing within Ukraine, and the aggregate proportion of people adopting 
Ukrainian, Russian, or other mother tongues.68  
After compiling the latest census data conducted by the Ukrainian government in 
2001, we were able to observe the population distribution of ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians across the country. The ethnic Russians predominantly congregate at the border 
zones adjacent to Russia, especially in the Donbass region and Crimea, while ethnic 
Ukrainians occupy the other western and northern regions of the country (see Figures 9 
                                                 
66 Geographically based Economic Data (G-Econ) Database Version 4.0.  
67 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
68 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
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and 10). We probed further to appreciate the interaction between both ethnic groups within 
Ukraine by using the equation derived by Reynal-Querol to quantify the extent of a 
country's ethnic polarization.69 A country experiences ethnic polarization when its 
population fragments into smaller bands that differentiate themselves based on distinct 
traits from other groups.70 We applied Reynal-Querol's formula to measure the ethnic 
divide between three major ethnic clusters, namely the native Ukrainians, ethnic Russians 
and all others within each Ukrainian city. The resultant demographics revealed that the 
Crimea and Donbass regions possess the highest levels of ethnic polarization within the 
nation (see Figure 11). Superimposing the demographic data with events in the same time 
frame, such as the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the sporadic organized 
violence and fatalities occurring in the Donbass region, this seem to indicate that ethnic 
polarization may have a significant correlation with deadly events occurring in the same 
area. Therefore, we chose ethnic polarization level as another control variable to offset its 
effect and better focus our experiment to reveal the true effect of social media.  
                                                 
69 José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, And Civil 
Wars." American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (June 2005), 798. 
70 Joan-Maria Esteban and Debraj Ray, "On the Measurement of Polarization," Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society 62, no. 4 (July 1994), 819. 
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Figure 9. Distribution of Ethnic Russians in Ukraine (Grid-Cell).71 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of Ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine (Grid-Cell).72 
                                                 
71 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
72 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
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Figure 11. Ethnic Polarization of Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine 
(Grid-Cell).73
                                                 
73 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All Ukraine Census 2001; Minnesota Population 
Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.1 Dataset. 
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V. RESULTS 
Six non-linear Poisson regression models are used to examine the predictive 
relationship between violent events in Ukraine and the prevalent dissent derived from the 
Twitter network against the Ukrainian government across different periods of 
administration between August 1, 2013 and July 31, 2014, inclusive. We had hypothesized 
that anti-Euromaidan sentiments would incite violence while pro-Euromaidan sentiments 
would reduce violence under the interim government between February 21, 2014 and May 
25, 2014, while only anti-Euromaidan sentiments will continue to trigger conflict under the 
pro-West administration under President Poroshenko effective May 25, 2014. Table 1 
captures the regression results for Twitter messages matching search terms in the Russian 
language. The first and second models in Table 1 demonstrate the relationship between the 
dependent variable of violent events and the independent variables of pro- and anti-
Euromaidan tweets matching Russian search terms under the interim government, and the 
pro-West administration respectively. The third model in Table 1 demonstrates the same 
relationship, but across the entire period of analysis from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014. 
Similarly, Table 2 captures the regression results for Twitter messages matching search 
terms in the Ukrainian language. In addition, six control variables—total volume of tweets, 
GDP, population density, percentage of ethnic Ukrainians, percentage of ethnic Russians, 
and degree of ethnic polarization—are applied for all models.  
Besides Twitter-derived sentiments metrics, all models in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that 
both GDP and ethnic polarization could also be significant variables affecting violence in 
Ukraine. To determine the impact of Twitter-derived metrics on the variation of violence 
in Ukraine, we generated additional models to compare the impact of the control variables 
with and without Twitter-derived metrics (see Tables 3 and 4). The first and second models 
in both Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the relationship between the dependent variable of 
violent events and the control variables with and without controlling for total volume of 
tweets across the entire period of analysis from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014 
respectively. Similarly, the third and fourth models in Tables 3 and 4 capture the regression 
results for Twitter messages matching search terms in Russian and Ukrainian language 
36 
with and without controlling for total number of tweets across the same time period, 
respectively. 














Table 4. Comparison of AIC Scores (Ukrainian Lexicons) 
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The results of the models produced three noteworthy findings. First, models with 
Twitter-derived sentiment metrics improved the prediction of violent events across Ukraine 
as reflected by the lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) scores. This reinforces our 
belief that the selection of exonyms in native languages as search terms on Twitter 
contributed significantly to the derivation of a metric reflective of the dissents against the 
Ukrainian government. Second, there is statistical evidence to suggest a significant 
correlation between violent events and Twitter-derived sentiment metrics against the 
Ukrainian government across different periods of administration. This is consistent with 
our claims that anti-Euromaidan tweets should incite violence under both the interim and 
pro-West authorities, while pro-Euromaidan tweets could reduce violence under the West-
leaning interim authorities. Third, future researchers should consider the impact of ethnic 
polarization on violence. There is statistical evidence to suggest a significant correlation 
between violent events and degree of ethnic polarization. 
A. FINDING ONE: TWITTER-DERIVED METRICS IMPROVES 
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT EVENTS 
Twitter-derived sentiment metrics improves the prediction of violent events in 
Ukraine from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014. Without the Twitter-derived metrics (see 
Tables 3 and 4, first model), the regression returns a significant correlation between violent 
events in Ukraine and the variables of GDP, population density, percentage of ethnic 
Ukrainians, percentage of ethnic Russians, and degree of ethnic polarization. Accounting 
for total number of tweets (see Tables 3 and 4, second model), the regression continues to 
return a significant correlation between violent events in Ukraine and all variables, 
including total number of tweets at a lower AIC score. With the incorporation of Twitter-
derived sentiments metrics (See Tables 3 and 4, third model), the regression model returns 
an even lower AIC score. Specifically for Table 3, which utilized Twitter-derived 
sentiments metrics generated from Russian lexicons, the relationship between violent 
events in Ukraine and the total number of tweets is no longer significant (See Table 3, third 
model). Notably also for Table 3, the removal of the total number of tweets as a control 
variable returns the lowest AIC score (See Table 3, fourth model). 
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Unlike the Twitter-derived metrics generated from Russian lexicons, Twitter-
derived sentiments metrics generated from Ukrainian lexicons did not render the total 
volume of tweets statistically insignificant (See Table 4, third and fourth models). Certain 
lexicons may have been misinterpreted or omitted due to our lack of local context. 
Alternatively, negative sentiments toward the Ukrainian government may not always lead 
to violent events. Peaceful demonstrations or protest could have been incited by the 
negative sentiments circulated on Twitter, or crashes between groups and the state 
authorities may not have resulted in death, and are thereby not captured by our dataset. 
B. FINDING TWO: THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT CORRELATION 
BETWEEN TWITTER-DERIVED SENTIMENT METRICS AND 
VIOLENT EVENTS IN UKRAINE 
Twitter-derived sentiment metrics improves the prediction of violent events in 
Ukraine across different periods of administration in Ukraine. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, anti-Euromaidan tweets should incite violence under the interim and pro-West 
authorities, while pro-Euromaidan tweets could reduce violence under the West-leaning 
interim authorities. The choice of search terms impacts the authenticity and usefulness of 
the Twitter-derived sentiment metrics. To quantify the significance of social media in 
inciting violence during the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine, we systematically 
examined terms used exclusively by the in-group against the out-group—sorted 
exclusively under pro- or anti-Euromaidan movement categories—and cross-examined 
them with publications on new media channels as well as historical symbols, myths and 
norms. We limited the terms to be exclusively in the Russian and Ukrainian language to 
match the unique demographics in Ukraine. We believe this contributed significantly to the 
usefulness of the accompanying Twitter-derived sentiment metrics, further improving the 
prediction of violent events in Ukraine across different periods of administration in 
Ukraine.  
To substantiate our claims, we generated regression plots (see Figures 12 and 13) 
to reflect the correlation between violent events in Ukraine from August 1, 2013 to July 
31, 2014 as reflected by the third model in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Figure 12. Regression Plots (Russian Lexicons) 
 
Figure 13. Regression Plots (Ukrainian Lexicons) 
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The visualizations of the regression plots reflect the statistical significance of each 
independent variable on the dependent variable (Violent Events) while holding all other 
variables in the model constant at their mean values. Through the visualization, we are able 
to isolate the independent variables and understand its predicted effect on the rise of violent 
events in Ukraine. The y-axis on each graph is the predicted outcome in terms of number 
of violent events in a grid cell, while the x-axis shows the shift in each independent variable 
from its minimum to maximum value. The respective prediction lines—black for total 
volume of tweets, blue for volume of pro-Euromaidan tweets, and red for volume of anti-
Euromaidan tweets—show how the expected number of Violent Events change as a 
function of the independent variables, with the slope of the line demonstrating either a 
positive or a negative relationship of the independent variables in relation to Violent Events. 
The shaded portions around the prediction lines represent the 95% confidence interval of 
the prediction.  
Using Figure 12 as an illustration, both Total Tweets and Anti-Euromaidan Tweets 
exhibit positive relationships to Violent Events, while Pro-Euromaidan Tweets exhibits a 
negative relationship to Violent Events. Given the statistical significance between the 
number of violent events and Twitter-derived sentiment metrics against the Ukrainian 
government across different periods of administration, coupled with low standard errors, 
we can conclude with confidence that there is a strong positive correlation between number 
of violent events in Ukraine and Twitter-derived sentiments metrics.  
C. FINDING THREE: ETHNIC POLARIZATION MAY IMPROVE THE 
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT EVENTS 
With Twitter-derived metrics and controlling for ethnicity alone (See Tables 5 and 
6, first model), we can conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
violent events and ethnicity from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014. However, we observe 
that both a positive correlation between violent events and the presence of both high 
percentages of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Hence, we controlled for the degree 
of ethnic polarization by factoring in the Reynal-Querol equation (See Tables 3 and 4, 
second model) to categorize and measure the ethnic divide between three clusters based on 
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their native ethnicity—ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Russians, and native locals who are 
neither of Ukrainian nor Russian decent.  










While the statistical evidence suggests that the correlation between violent events in 
Ukraine from August 1, 2013 to July 31, 2014 and both the presence of high percentages of 
ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians remain statistically significant, the incorporation of 
the Reynal-Querol equation as a control reveals that the correlation between violent events 
and degree of ethnic polarization is also statistically significant, with a better AIC score. To 
substantiate our claims, we generated a regression plot (see Figure 14) to visualize the 
correlation between violent events in Ukraine and the degree of ethnic polarization. 
 
Figure 14. Regression Plot (Ethnic Polarization) 
In Figure 14, the black prediction line shows the expected number of Violent Events 
change as a function of the shift in Ethnic Polarization Score. The slope of line demonstrates 
a positive relationship of Ethnic Polarization Score in relation to Violent Events. The shaded 
portions around the prediction line represents the 95% confidence interval of the prediction. 
As such, we can conclude with confidence that there is a strong positive correlation between 
number of violent events in Ukraine and the degree of ethnic polarization.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Our thesis began with our curiosity about social media’s influence over social 
behavior, especially in regions burdened by perennial contentions within the population. 
We committed ourselves to pursue this analysis because this specific area of research is 
still in a nascent stage, and focused predominantly on selected countries of critical political 
interest. We attempted to venture beyond the boundaries of earlier studies by approaching 
our thesis from a different perspective by stressing on the degree of ethnic polarization, as 
well as the interaction between groups through unique exonyms conceived on social media. 
We hypothesized that through social media data analysis, we would be able to draw a 
correlation between the virtual propagation of public sentiments and the physical 
manifestation of violent predispositions, and thus generate a credible prediction model for 
the onset of civil violence. 
Through our research, we found that the traditional concept of utilizing “hard 
power” to exert the state's dominance has gradually been undermined by the exploitation 
of “soft power.” Divisive propaganda disseminated on social media platforms have 
increasingly become more effective in establishing new social norms and inducing 
organized collective action to achieve a desired outcome by the promulgators. The unique 
challenge of our analysis was to determine a fitting method to precisely locate and measure 
true sentiments found on social media in both foreign Russian and Ukrainian languages to 
be factored into the algorithm. 
To construct our statistical models, we mapped out the dependent variable, 
occurrences of civil violence across Ukraine, consolidated from the UCDP database against 
the independent variable, pro- and anti-Euromaidan lexicons, found on pre-collected 
Twitter data licensed by NPS. In order to increase the robustness of our models, we further 
controlled the experiment for both “hard power” and “soft power” variables such as 
Ukraine's GDP Per Capita level captured by the G-Econ Project, and its ethnic polarization 
index, derived through data from the All-Ukrainian Population Census. 
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In conclusion, our thesis resulted in three noteworthy findings. Firstly, statistical 
evidence suggests that Twitter-derived metrics improves the prediction of violent events 
against the Ukrainian government across different periods of administration. Secondly, 
there is statistical evidence to suggest a significant correlation between violent events and 
Twitter-derived sentiment metrics against the Ukrainian government across different 
periods of administration. Last but not least, there is statistical evidence to suggest a 
significant correlation between violent events and degree of ethnic polarization, given the 
presence of negative dissent against the Ukrainian government. The findings support our 
initial hypothesis, thus reinforcing our belief that the selection of exonyms in native 
languages as search terms on Twitter contributed significantly to the derivation of a metric 
reflective of the dissents against the Ukrainian government.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intent for our thesis is not only to illustrate social media's capacity to be 
exploited for inciting collective violence, but more importantly, to provide a framework 
that accentuates the utility of “soft power” in sound governance. Through the results of our 
models, we find that ethnic polarization is a significant variable that enhances the 
correlation between negative social media sentiments and violence. It may be beneficial 
for state authorities to track settlement patterns of major ethnic groups within the country, 
and incentivize greater assimilation and movement within the population in order to 
disperse concentrations of ethnic groups within a specific region. 
In addition, state administrations that are confronted with budding social unrest in 
their country, can harness the power of social media data analysis to obtain early warning, 
and potentially adopt preemptive actions to mitigate the consequences. In light of the 
increasing role that social media plays in modern political activism, governments should 
invest in a national cyber information and strategic communication task force that has the 
capacity to undertake three critical missions. First, they must be able to closely monitor the 
pulse of the populace’s sentiments through various forms of social media channels. Next, 
they must be able to design a cyber-trawling algorithmic tool to make sense of the data 
collated to detect early indicators of potential violent outbreaks in specific locations. 
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Lastly, they must be able to develop counter-narratives and strategic communication 
policies to foster pro-government support while mediating any potential political 
opposition before the onset of collective violence. 
B. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
During the course of our research, we have identified some areas of interest that 
future studies could delve into. First and foremost, our thesis only took into account violent 
events consolidated by the UCDP database, which only tracks conflicts that result in one 
or more death between government forces and organized entities. This data set does not 
include all other cases of conflict such as peaceful demonstrations or violent protests that 
do not result in any fatalities. By incorporating these events, the number of observations 
significantly increases over the designated time frame, therefore reinforcing the data 
analysis to derive a stronger correlation between the independent and dependent variables. 
Another limitation that our thesis faced was the inadequate access to the wide 
spectrum of social media databases due to proprietary issues. We relied primarily on the 
Twitter archive licensed by NPS to collate our independent variable. Other theses should 
explore the prospect of trawling data from other open source social media platforms, such 
as Facebook, to establish a linkage with a more extensive user population when conducting 
similar analysis consequently. Moreover, due to our linguistic deficiency in both Russian 
and Ukrainian language, we had to seek assistance from SME faculty members at the DLI 
to create the library of lexicons. Despite their linguistic proficiency and the extensive effort 
devoted to the scholastic research, certain lexicons may be misinterpreted or omitted due 
to the lack of local context. A more comprehensive and accurate library of lexicons could 
be built with the consultation of local activists and government officials. 
In addition, future studies can also attempt to dissect the independent variable 
further by applying the library of both Russian and Ukrainian lexicons under the various 
sub-categories instead of just the binary pro- and anti-Euromaidan classifications we used 
for our analysis. By doing so, they can better pinpoint the determinant category of lexicons 
that incite violence within the larger classifications. Furthermore, other forms of social 
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demographic data, such as education level and age group, can be included as control 
variables in order to create a more robust statistical model. 
Furthermore, with recent cyber advancement, it is increasingly challenging to 
discern between tweets originating from humans and computer bots. It is evident that some 
political entities have invested heavily in cyber technology that can masquerade as 
passionate human activists fighting for, or against, social issues of the agent's 
predisposition. Consequently, we faced the challenge of discerning between true human 
tweets and those promulgated by computer bots. Future research could design a more astute 
code to flag out the false tweets from the data set and incorporate a social network analysis 
to ascertain the central actors that the tweets originate from. 
Last but not least, it is essential to see whether the results of our thesis can be 
replicated in other countries. Future research should shift their attention onto other regions 
around the world that are undergoing parallel social conflicts. By applying a similar data 
analysis, we would be able to compare and contrast the results, thus revealing if our model 
only works on a specific region and event, or that it has a more versatile utility that can aid 
other state administrations to better exercise “soft power” for sound governancethis page 
intentionally left blank  
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APPENDIX A.  LIST OF RUSSIAN LEXICONS 
A. PRO-EUROMAIDAN TERMS 
1. President Yanukovych-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
1 Yanyk Янык Abbreviation of last name 
2 Yajtsevich Яйцевич 
Blending of name and obscene word, at the same time a reference to 
the famous 2004 "egg incident" in Ivano-Frankivsk, when an 
opposition activist threw an egg at Yanukovych causing him to fall  
3 Yanukriminalovich Янукриминалович Blending of name and "criminal" referring to his criminal past 
4 Bandyukovich Бандюкович Blending of name and "banda" (gang) 
5 Proffesor Проффесор 
Intentional misspelling of "Professor", a spelling error Yanukovych 
allegedly had made when writing down his occupation 
6 Yanukodlovich Янукодлович Blending of name and common derogatory word  
7 Yanukovosch Януковощ Blending of name and "vegetable" to indicate lack of thinking ability 
8 Yalynkovich Ялынкович 
Blending of name and possibly Ukrainian word for "fir tree," mocking 
incident in which he mis-pronounced said word and attempt to dissolve 
crowd of Maidan protesters under the excuse of setting up New year 
tree in the main city square (Maidan) 
9 Yanushesku Янушеску Blending of name and Ceausescu, deposed Romanian dictator 
10 Yanuko_vich Януко-ВИЧ 
Highlighting VICH at the end of his name which is an abbreviation for 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
11 Chivokunya Чивокун 
His name backwards, happens to produce a comical effect, sounds cute 
and funny but is minimizing and conveys condescension 
12 Yalegitimnyj Ялегитимн 
Blending of name and "legitimate" referring to his claims of legitimacy 
which sounds like "I am legitimate" because "Ya" means "I" in Russian 
13 Pidaresht Пидарешт Expressing desire to see Yanukovych under arrest 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
14 Megazhirye Мегажирь 
Blending of "Mezhigorye," former Presidential residence and "mega-
fat" to indicate over-the-top luxury 
15 Bykoko Быкоко 
Deliberate distortion of "rococo" to refer to style of gaudy luxury, 
derived from (bull) invoking association with cattle 
16 Mezhizverye Межизверь 
Blending of "Mezhigorye," former Presidential residence, and 
"beasts/barbarity" to indicate cruelty 
17 Urkaina Уркаин 
Deliberate transposition of letters in the spelling of Ukraine to make it 
sound like the land of "urka" (criminals). This term may be used by 
anti-Maidan/anti-Ukrainian movement at the present time as well 
18 Mizdobuli Миздобули; МиЗдобули 
Slightly altered Ukrainian for "We have achieved/done/accomplished" 
to refer to fake claims of accomplishments by the regime 
2. UK Parliament-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
19 Zrada Зрад 
Referring to Rada by a similarly sounding Ukrainian word that means 
"betrayal". It could also be used in all kinds of contexts unrelated to 
Rada. However, a hashtag was created referring to unfavorable 
decisions made by Rada, so an increased usage of this word suggests 
a reference to Ukrainian legislature, rather than unrelated instances of 
"betrayal", for example, in relationships and other contexts  
20 Knopkodav Кнопкодав 
"Button-presser," lawmaker who obediently follows Yanukovych's 
will in voting 
21 Zekon Зэкон 
Law passed by a "incarcerated"/"criminal" which is a commonly used 
colloquialism originating from the first letters of the Russian word 
for "incarcerated"; referring to criminality of Ukrainian lawmakers 
and Yanukovych's past criminal record 
22 Pakhanat Паханат 
From criminal/jail argot term "head of a gang," prison authority 
figure. Pakhanat is a regime where the highest-ranking criminal 
authority figures are in charge 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
23 Aziriv Азирив 
Deliberate Ukrainization/distortion of the name of former Prime 
Minister of Ukraine Azarov who was known for distorting Russian 
words in an attempt to make them sound Ukrainian to compensate for 
his lack of competency in the Ukrainian language 
24 Azirivka Азиривк The language of Azarov (see above) 
25 Bloodsuckers Кровосис 
Infamous example of Azirivka (see above) when Azarov modified 
the Russian word "bloodsuckers" attempting (and failing) to make it 
sound Ukrainian 
26 Tridebilling Тридебилинг 
Blending of "three" and "imbecile", reference to appearance of 
Yanukovych and two other former Ukrainian politicians 
(Zakharchenko and Pshonka) in the Russian city of Rostov where 
they claimed they were the legitimate authority 
27 Banduget Банду геть; Бандугеть 
Ukrainian "____" (meaning "down" or "out" with something) 
incorporated into this slogan that calls for doing away with 
Yanukovych's corrupt regime  
28 Panduget Панду геть; Пандугеть Same as above but "banda" (gang) changed to "panda" 
3. Anti-Euromaidan Forces-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
29 Titushka Tитуш 
Derogatory reference to athletic young men bussed in from Russia to 
provoke and intimidate Maidan protesters; originated from Titushko, 
last name of the youth identified as the perpetrator of an infamous 
beating of journalists, later came to denote other uses of deliberate 
deceit and provocation, especially by paid agents 
30 Prostitushka Проституш Blending of "titushka" and prostitute (see above) 
31 Tritushka Тритуш 
Politicians; blending of "titushka" and the Russian word for "three", 
sarcastic reference to three opposition leaders (Yatsenyuk, Klichko 
and Tyagnibok) for their initial indecisiveness and attempts to 
negotiate with Yanukovych 
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32 Rostitushka Роституш 
Blending of "titushka" and Rostov (city in Russia) where Titushko 
(see above) who became a symbol of use of quasi-criminal element 
for hire against Maidan originally came from (was bussed in with a 
group of rough athletic youths) 
33 Titushkobus Титушкобус 
Bus filled with rough athletic Russian young men like Titushko (see 
above) brought in to intimidate pro-Maidan protesters 
34 Titushkovod Титушковод 
One who coordinates (leads, pulls the strings of) youths like Titushko 
(see above) 
35 Mentushka Ментуш 
Blending of "titushka" and "ment", pejorative form of "militiaman" 
(old Soviet term for "policeman") 
36 Bitushka Битуш 
Blending of "titushka" and "to beat"; individual used/hired to beat up 
protesters 
4. UK Special Forces-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
37 Berkutnya Беркутн Pejorative (collective noun) form of "Berkut" 
38 Berkutyata  Беркутят 
"Berkut" chicks (as in young eagle chicks), sounds minimizing and 
condescending ("berkut" is a kind of eagle)  
39 Ptentsy Птенц "Chicks, little birdies", condescending reference to "Berkut" 
40 Poultryfactory Птицефабрик 
"Poultry factory", reducing eagles to poultry, another condescending 
reference to Berkut or a place where they congregate 
5. Russian Media-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 








S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
43 Kiselevosti  Киселёвост; Киселевост 
Blending of Kiselev and news; news delivered by or "a la" Kiselev 
(see above) 
44 Kisel_TV Кисель-ТВ 
Reduced form of Kiselev's last name (which happens to be the name 
of a common traditional Russian starchy beverage) plus TV (i.e., TV 
Kiselev-style)  
45 Kiselev_viewer Киселезрител TV viewer who watches Kiselev show 
46 Nevroshovinist Нейрошовинист Neurochauvinist 
47 Shkurnalist Шкурналист 
Blending of "skin", also "dishonest person" and journalist, implies 
dishonest journalist for hire 
48 Obosrevatel Обосревател 
Blending of "observer" (as in "political observer") and an obscene 
word 
49 Journalizd Журнализд Blending of "journalist" and a vulgar reference 
50 Journa_slut Журнашлюх Blending of "journalist" and "slut" 
51 Telefascism Телефашизм Implies that media promotes fascism 
52 Mediafreniya Медиафрени Blending of "media" and "schizophrenia" 
53 Propagandist Пропагандон Blending of "propaganda" and an obscene word 
54 Virtitushka Виртитуш 
Virtual "titushka", unscrupulous person for hire who operates in the 
virtual world 
55 Ayteetushka Айтитуш 
IT-titushka,  unscrupulous person for hire who operates via 
technology 
56 Kremlin_bot Кремлебот Entity serving the Kremlin in media/social media 
6. President Putin-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
57 Khaputin Хапутин 
Blending of "Putin" and the verb meaning "to grab, take by force or 
unlawfully" 
58 Kaputin Капутин 




S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
59 Putler Путлер Blending of "Putin" and "Hitler" 
60 Putlerovets Путлеров Putin follower 
61 Putlerovskij Путлеровск 
Adjective formed from "Putler", "Putler"-like, belonging to or 
characteristic of "Putler"  
62 Unter_fuhrer Недофюрер 
"Not quite" a fuhrer meaning aspiring but not quite successful as a 
fuhrer (i.e., Nazi leader) 
63 Pukin Пукин Blending of "Putin" and a vulgar word 
64 Putenok Путен; Путён 
Blending of "Putin" and "duckling" (or other bird or animal 
offspring/youngling), minimizing, condescending 
65 Uti_Puti Ути-Пути Condescending nickname 
66 Putya Путя 
One of Putin's nicknames (in Nominative case); this form as well as 
other case forms are included instead of the word stem because the 
stem would coincide with a common Russian word ("____") and, 
therefore, would come up in the search in the meaning unrelated to 
Putin, so it is not listed here. Genitive and Instrumental case forms 
could not included for the same reason (they coincide with various 
forms of this word)  *Some other neologisms that can be mistaken 
for common Russian words were not listed but this particular one is a 
common nickname of Putin so it appears beneficial to include at least 
some of its forms that do not overlap with other (unrelated) ones.  
67 Putyu Путю Same in Accusative case 
68 Putye Путе Same in Dative and Prepositional case forms 
69 Nerukopozhatyj Нерукопожат 
Not technically correct but perfectly comprehensible way of forming 
an adjective/participle that expresses the following in one word 
"someone whose hand was not pressed/shaken" referring to foreign 
heads of states not shaking Putin's hand 
70 Putinism Путинизм Putinism (like Leninism or Marxism) 
71 Zaputitsya Запути; Запутин 
Verb formed from "for" plus "Putin", to start supporting Putin; also 
happens to sound close to "to get lost/confused") 
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72 Putinoid Путиноид Putin-robot 
73 Putikantrop Путикантроп Pre-historic (primitive) Putin-like or Putin-supporting creature 
74 Putinovivat Путиновиват 
From "Putin" and "Vivat!"; referring to support of Putin's policy, 
used sarcastically 
75 Puting Путинг 
"Putin" blended with English "-ing" (possibly to refer to a pro-Putin 
rally or activity) 
76 Putinomics Путиномик Blending of "Putin" and "economics"  
77 Putinomicheskij Путиномич Adjective formed from "Putinomics" (see above) 
78 GotPutin 
Путин есть – ума не 
надо; Путин есть, ума не 
надо; Путин есть ума не 
надо 
Deliberate substitution in the well-known saying "Got money - don't 
need brains" 
7. Russia-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
79 Rashka Рашк Distorted "Russia", pejorative 
80 Parashka Парашк 
Play on words, blending of pejorative form for "Russia" with a 
vulgarism 
81 Rashaputiniya Рашапутин Blending of pejorative form for "Russia" and "Putin" 
82 Putinland Путинлэнд Putin + "land" 
83 Rashkostan Рашкостан Blending of pejorative form for "Russia" and "-stan" 
84 Katsap Кацап Pejorative exonym for "Russian person" 
85 Katsapstan Кацапстан Blending of pejorative exonym for "Russian person" and "-stan" 
86 Katsapendiya Кацапенди 
"Land of katsaps" (formed from pejorative ethnic lable for Russian 
person) 
87 Federastiya Федераст 
Blending of "Federation" and "pederast", common vulgarism used to 
refer to pedophiles 
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88 RF_iya ЭрЭфи 
Pejorative reference to Russia formed from the first letters of Russian 
Federation (RF) 
89 Katsapantrop Кацапантроп Blending of "katsap" and pre-historic (primitive) creature 
90 Katsapcheg Кацапчег Land of "katsap" 
91 Mordor Мордор Reference to Russia as the land of zombie-fied residents (Tolkien) 
92 Gollum Голлум Reference to Putin followers as unthinking robots (Tolkien) 
93 Matskva Мацкв 
Pejorative distortion of "Moscow", possibly imitating Moscow 
pronunciation (phonetic feature of local dialect) 
94 Matskovskij Мацковск Adjective formed from the above 
95 Moskal Москал Derogatory ethnic term for Russian resident of Moscow or a Russian 
96 Matskal Мацкал Same as above 
97 Moskovit Московит Same as above 
98 ProRossist Пророссист Pro-Russian element/individual 
99 Rashak Рашак Pejorative form of Russian  
100 Rashist Рашист Blending of pejorative form for Russia and "fascist" 
101 Putinpamagi Путинпамаги 
"Putin" plus intentionally incorrectly spelled "to help" (in Imperative 
form, referring to anti-Maidan actors appealing to Putin for help) 
102 Separator Сепаратор Person who supports separation of Ukrainian territories from Ukraine 
103 Sepr Сепр same as above 
104 Separatyak Сепаратяк same as above 
105 Separashist Сепарашист Blending of the above and "fascist" 
106 Imperialists Имперц 
Pejorative form of Imperialists (referring to perceived imperial 
designs by Russia) 
107 Rashachnya Рашачн Pejorative collective noun referring to Russians 
108 Kolorad Колорад 
Russian patriots who frequently wear Russian St. George Ribbons 
that resemble the colors of the Colorado beetle 
109 Vatnik Ватник 
Reference to a person wearing a "vatnik", cheap Russian winter coat 
made with heavy cotton padding to protect from the cold, supposedly 
worn by hired or Russia-affiliated anti-Maidan protesters  
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110 Vatan Ватан Same as above 
111 Nyashmyash Няшмяш 
Associated with former Ukrainian City Prosecutor of Simferopol Ms. 
Poklonskaya who is considered a traitor of the Ukraine after she 
started serving Russian authorities. When due to her anime-like 
cuteness, she was named "nya"/"nyash", she famously replied that 
she will not allow any "nyashmyash". "Nyash" has come to denote 




страна погромная leave us alone 
8. Crimea-Related Terms 




Commonly used sarcastically to refer to Russian expansionist 
aspirations and to supporters of the annexation of the Crimea by 
Russia  
114 Rashkrysh Рашкрыш 
Similar to above with "Rash" used for "Russia" and the last 
consonant changed to "sh" for homophonic effect 
115 Skrymzit Скрымз; Скрымзд 
Newly coined verb meaning to steal or take away unlawfully formed 
with "Krym" (Crimea) as its root  
116 Occupendum Оккупендум 
Blending of "referendum" and "occupy" referring to the Crimean 
referendum 
117 Uberikamerublya Уберикамерубля 
"Put away your camera" followed by a common expletive all spelled 
as a single word as in the "Ubericameryblya"-type Country or 





9. Russian Region-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
118 Lugandon Лугандон Blending of "Lugansk" and an obscene word 
119 Luganda Луганд Blending of "Lugansk" and "Uganda", used derogatorily 
120 Donbabve Донбабве Blending of "Donetsk" or "Don" and Zimbabwe, used derogatorily 
121 Dombabve Домбабве 
Same as above with "n" replaced by "m", also the way it is 
pronounced happens to sound like "dumb" 
122 Domborossiya Домборосси 
Blending of "Dombabve" and "Rossiya", cf. Novorossiya (the name 
Lugansk and Donetsk pro-Russian separatists use to refer to their 
territory) 
123 Daunbass Даунбасс 
Blending of "Donbass" (name of the coal region as in Donetsk basin) 
and "Down" as in Down syndrome 
124 Dambass Дамбасс Similar to above, also sounds like English "Dumbass" 
 
B. ANTI-EUROMAIDAN TERMS 
1. Maidan Verbs 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
1 Majdanit майдани 
Verb formed using "maidan" as its root, typically meaning to protest, 
rebel, be unruly, etc. This and other verbs may also appear in the 
reflexive form ("majdanit'sya") and the search for the specified 
strings should catch the reflexive forms as well 
2 Majdannichat майданни 
Same formed using a different derivational pattern, with clear 
pejorative meaning 
3 Majdanut майдану Similar but perfective aspect form 
4 Majdanutyj майданут 




S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
5 Namajdanit намайдани 
Possibly "to cause trouble". This and other verbs below are formed 
by adding various verbal prefixes which can express a variety of 
meanings that are best understood in context 
6 Promajdanit промайдани 
Possibly "to miss, to lose". This and other verbs listed here are 
formed by adding common verbal prefixes which can express a 
variety of meanings that are best understood in the specific context in 
which they appear 
7 Pomajdanit помайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
8 Razmajdanit размайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
9 Vmajdanit вмайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
10 Vymajdanit вымайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
11 Domajdanit домайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
12 Zamajdanit замайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
13 Otmajdanit отмайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
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14 Izmajdanit измайдани 
This and other verbs listed here are formed by adding common verbal 
prefixes which can express a variety of meanings that are best 
understood in the specific context in which they appear 
2. Maidan Derivatives 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
15 Maidanschik майданщи Someone engaging in Maidan protests 
16 Majdan_rascal майдаплут Blending of "Majdan" and "trickster" 
17 Majdalnyj Mайдальн 
Blending of "Maidan" and "Navalny", Russian politician and 
opposition leader who supported Maidan 
18 Majdashenko Майдашенко 
Blending of "Maidan" and "Timoshensko" (former Ukrainian premier 
Yulia Timoshenko who supported Maidan) 
19 Maidan_idiot майдалох Blending of "Maidan" and "idiot" 
20 Majdan_criminal майдазэк 
Blending of "Maidan" and "incarcarated criminal," in particular, in 
reference to Yulia Timoshenko 
21 Majdan_arbeiter майданобайтер 
Blending of "Maidan" and "arbeiter," referring to those who allegedly 
protest for money 
22 Majdanolog майданолог Maidan pundit, demagogue 
23 Majdarast майдараст Blending of "Maidan" and a vulgarism denoting "pedophile" 
24 Majdown майдаун Blending of "Maidan" and "Down syndrome" 
25 EuroMajdown евромайдаун Same with Euro- added upfront 
26 Majdaner майданюк Blending of "Maidan" and a vulgarism 
27 Majdanopitek майданопитек Blending of "Maidan" and a vulgarism 
28 Animal_exhibit Зверинец; Зверинц 
Pejorative reference to Maidan gatherings that were fenced where 
access was controlled 
29 Majdabug майдабаг 
Blending of "Maidan" and "bug", problems/malfunctions experienced 
by Maidan movement 
30 Maidafuk майдафак Blending of "Maidan" and "f**k"  
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31 Majdabajda майдабайда Blending of "Maidan" and "nonsense" 
32 Majdafottrabakh майдафоттрабах 
Incident in which Maidan journalists were "deservedly" beaten by 
police 
33 Majdan_slogan майдафраз Maidan slogan 
34 Majdan_revolution майдануци 
Blending of Maidan and revolution in a way that also sounds like an 
obscene form  and suggests failure 
    
3. Ukraine-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
35 Ukrs укры 
Abbreviation of "Ukrainians", pejorative way of referring to 
Ukrainian people   * Only plural form is included because the 
singular form represents a common string 
36 Ukrop укроп 
Pejorative reference to a Ukrainian person, also means "dill" which is 
a common herb used in cooking 
37 Ukropstan Укропстан Formed "Ukrop" and -stan, pejorative reference to Ukraine 
38 Ukropotamiya Укропотам Derogatory reference to Ukraine as land of "Ukrop" 
39 Ukruina Укруин 
Deliberate pejorative distortion of the word "Ukraine" to convey 
destruction 
40 Ukhreina Ухреин 
Blending of "Ukraine" and an obscene word   *CAUTION: has clear 
obfuscated obscene root 
41 Usraina Усраин 
Blending of "Ukraine" and a vulgarism   *CAUTION: has clear 
obfuscated vulgar root 
42 Ugraina Уграин 
Deliberate distortion of "Ukraine", possibly because it creates 
phonetic associations with other sounding words to convey the 
meaning of "screwed up" 
43 Podpindosiya  Подпиндос 
Reference to the Ukraine as a country "under" the USA (subjugated 
by USA, derogatory word used for USA) 
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44 Ukro_pitek Укропитек Another blending of "Ukrop" and a vulgarism 
45 Ukro_cattle Укробыдл blending of "Ukrop" and a derogatory word invoking cattle 
46 Natio_cattle нациобыдл Blending of nation/national/nationalism and same derogatory word 
47 Ukrop_army укропарми "dill army", pejorative reference to the Ukrainian military 
48 Ukro_fascist Укрофашист Blending of Ukr and "fascist" 
49 Fashik фашик Pejorative/diminutive form of "fascist" 
50 Khokhol хохол Pejorative exonym 
51 Khokhly хохл 
Version of same as above but with the fleeting vowel (ref. Russian 
grammar) removed as it disappears in some case forms as well as in 
the corresponding adjective 
52 Kakol какол Blending of above and a vulgarism 
53 Kakly какл Same as above for plural and other forms 
54 Kakel какел Same as above 
55 Kaklopitek каклопитек  Blending of the above vulgar blend with another common vulgarism 
56 Khokhlop хохлоп Blending of exonym and "Kholop" which means "serf" 
57 Khokhlyad хохляд Blending of exonym and an obscene word 
58 Khokhlo_junta хохлохунт Blending of exonym and "junta" 
59 Khokhlo_manure хохлонавоз Blending of exonym and "manure" 
60 Khokhlo_battalion хохлополк Blending of exonym and "regimen" (as in "military battalion") 
61 Pan_headed кастрюлеголов Reference to use of pots/pans by Maidan protesters 
62 Hero 
херой; херою; хероя; 
хероем; херое; херои; 
хероев; хероям; 
хероями; хероях 
Deliberate distortion of the Russian word for "hero" that makes 
association with an obscene word 
63 Orange_oid оранжоид 
Referring to a supporter of the "orange" revolution in a derogatory 
form 
64 Lard_eater салоед Pejorative reference to a Ukrainian 
65 Anizhdet аниждет 
Distortion/Blending of "But they are kids!"; a reference by a pro-
Ukrainian source's reference to youths participating in Maidan who 
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were roughed up by government forces as "merely kids" (the anti-
Maidan side perceives them as adult militants, not kids) 
66 Onizhdet oниждет Same as above 
67 Informed_one свидомит; свидораст 
Sarcastic reference to a Ukrainian who claims to be an expert, formed 
from corresponding Ukrainian word 
68 Unity_supporter униаст Unification (of Ukraine) enthusiast blended with a vulgar word 








щэнэвмерлик Pejorative distortion of a slogan "It has not died yet" 
72 Movnyuk мовнюк 
Derogatory blending of the Ukrainian word for language "mova" and 
a vulgarism 
73 Dnepro_Judovsk Днепрожидовск Blending of Dnepropetrovsk (city) and derogatory word for "Jew" 
74 Traitor_nationalist Национал-предател A traitor motivated by nationalism 
75 Vyshivatnik Вышиватник 
A person wearing a traditional emroidered Ukrainian shirt, Ukrainian 
nationalist 
4. Ukraine Historical-related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
76 Mazepa_fan мазепи 
Supporter of Mazepa, controversial Cossack leader of 17/18th 
century; other words are possible with this stem, e.g., "mazepinka", 
adjective "mazepinskij", etc. 
77 Neo_Mazepist неомазепи Same as above with "Neo" added upfront (as in the word Neo-Nazi) 
78 Bandera_fan бандеров 
Supporter of Bandera, controversial leader during the time of WWII; 
other words possible, e.g., adjective "banderovskij", etc. 
79 Bendera_fan бендеров Same as above, different spelling 
80 Bander_log бандерлог Pejorative reference to a supporter of Bandera  
 
66 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
81 Bender_log бендерлог Same as above, different spelling 
82 Bander_trop бандертрол Also a pejorative reference to a supporter of Bandera  
83 Bender_trop бендертрол Same as above, different spelling 
84 Judo_Bander жидобандер Blending of a derogatory term for "Jew" and "Bandera" 
85 Judo_Bender жидобендер Same as above, different spelling 
86 Petlyura_fan петлюров 
Supporter of Petlyura, controversial leader during the time of civil 
war after the October Revolution of 1917; other words possible, e.g., 
adjective "petlyurovskij", etc. 
5. Ukraine Historical-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
87 Lard_dropped Сало Уронили 
Pejorative distortion of the "Glory to the Ukraine"; literal translation 
"Lard has been dropped", contains a reference to lard as a traditional 
staple of Ukrainian diet 
88 Shroud_Ukraine Саван Украине 
"Shroud to the Ukraine", pejorative distortion of "Glory to the 
Ukraine" 
89 Lard_Ukraine 
Сало Украине; Сала 
Украине "Lard to the Ukraine" pejorative distortion of "Glory to the Ukraine" 
90 Lard_Heroes 
Хероям сала; Хероям 
сало "Lard to the heroes", pejorative distortion of "Glory to the Ukraine" 
91 FU_Lard Херовое сало  
"[Expletive] Lard"; pejorative distortion of "Glory to the Ukraine" 
that contains an obscenity 
6. Ukraine Organization-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
92 Pravosek правосек 
Member or supporter of the "Right Sector" ("Pravyj sektor") 
Ukrainian political fraction 
 
67 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
93 Pedalik педалик 
Derogatory reference to V. Klichko, former boxer and currently a 
politician, one of the leaders of Maidan 
94 Yulka Юльк 
Pejorative diminutive for Yulia (Yulia Timoshenko, former 
Ukrainian Prime Minister) 
95 Yulfan Юльфан 
Another pejorative diminutive for Yulia (Yulia Timoshenko, former 
Ukrainian Prime Minister) 
96 Yulebot Юлебот Blending of Yulia and "bot" 
97 Thievish_Yulia 
Жулия; жулию; жулии; 
жулие; жулией Blending of "crook" and Yulia 
98 Zhulia ВорЮл 
Blending of "thief" and Yulia (with the initial letter of her name 
typically capitalized in the middle of the word) 
99 Yajtsenyuk Яйценюк 
Pejorative distortion of Yatsenyuk, post-Maidan Prime-Minister of 
the Ukraine, by blending it with a vulgarism 
100 Yajtsenyukh Яйценюх A different vulgar distortion of Yatsenyuk's name 
101 Tsutsenyuk Цуценюк Blending of a pejorative word with Yatsenyuk's name 
102 Yajtsepuk Яйцепук Blending of his name with two vulgarisms 
103 Yasenkher Ясенхер Blending of his first name, last name, and obscenity 
104 Kulyavlob Кулявлоб 
Blending of "bullet in the forehead," sarcastically referring to 
Yatsenyuk based on his famous pronouncement that he was ready for 
a bullet to his head 
105 Kulejvlob Кулейвлоб same with the first word in the Instrumental case form 
106 Usur_pastor Узурпастор 
Reference to Turchinov who is a "pastor" who "usurped" power 
(blending of "usurp" and "pastor") 
107 Trupchinov Трупчинов Blending of Turchinov and the word for "corpse" 
108 Turchinator Турчинатор Blending of Turchinov and "terminator" 
109 Polufabrikant Полуфабрикант 
Blending, reference to Petro Poroshenko, post-Majdan Ukrainian 




S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
110 Roshenko Рошенко 
Reference to Petro Poroshenko by the name of his chocolate business 
"Roshen" 




Sarcastic nickname of Oleg Tyagnibok who was part of the 
opposition prior to Majdan 
113 Vognegasnik Вогнегасник 
Sarcastic nickname for Klichko earned after an incident involving 
him being doused with a fire extinguisher 
114 Ne_uper неупер 
Perjorative reference to a person/politician who falsely proclaims 
himself/herself to be unbiased; a contracted form of the 
corresponding Ukrainian word  
7. Ukraine Organization-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
115 Ukro_post укропост Biased post by the pro-Ukrainian side 
116 Khokhlo_media хохло-сми Blending of exonym and "media" 
8. West-Related Terms 




118 Euro_bastard европодон 
Blending of "euro" (as in "European" referring to Western Europe) 
and a derogatory word 
119 Euro_parasite евротунеяд Euro-parasite 
120 Euro_traitor европредател Euro-traitor 
121 Euro_liar евролжец Euro-liar 
122 Euro_bastard евросволоч Blending of "euro" and a different derogatory word 
123 Euro_sodomy евросодом Euro-sodomy 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
124 Gayropa гейроп 
Gay-Europe (derogatory reference to Western Europe for recognizing 
gay rights 
125 Majduropa майдуроп 
Blending of "maidan" and "Europe" referencing belief that Western 
European nations were among those behind Maidan as well as 
Maidan movement European leanings 
126 Pindos пиндос; пендос 
Derogatory reference to Americans, which interestingly originated as 
a derogatory reference to Greeks, then transfer of meaning occurred 
127 Ameristan Пиндостан; Пиндустан 
Blending of derogatory word for "American" and "-stan", reference 
to USA 
128 Washington_facist Фашингтон Blending of "fascist" and Washington (as in DC) 
129 Jew_nato Жидо-НАТО Blending of derogatory term for "jew" and Nato 
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF UKRAINIAN LEXICONS 
A. PRO-EUROMAIDAN TERMS 
1. President Yanukovich-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
1 falshuvannya фальшування Falsification (of intent, ref to Yanukovych) 
2 zoloti batoni золоті батони “Golden loaves“ of Yanukovych, oligarch 
3 personanongrata персона-нон-грата Reference to Yanukovych, et al 
4 professor проффесор 
Yanukovych's misspelling on his application for President earned 
him the nickname Proffessor 
5 impichment імпічмент Impeachment; constituents wanted Yanukovych gone 
6 zradnik зрадник Traitor 
7 sutener сутенер Pimp 
8 Yanucharamtaiga янучарам - тайга Send pro-Yanukovych folks to taiga in Siberia 
9 kham Хам Boor, cad  
10 Vityachao Вітя, чао Ciao, lil Victor (ref. to Yanukovych) 
11 Yevnukhovich Евнухович Anti-Semitic ref. to Yanukovych (yevrey = jew) 
12 zaprodanets запроданець Invader, traitor 
13 virodok виродок Monster 
14 Yaytsepad Яйцепад Testicles (yaytsi)  fell, ref to Yanukovych's lack of balls 
15 Soochey syn Сучий син Son of a Bitch, ref to Yanukovych 
16 yolka йолка 
Combination Ukrainian word (yolop = dolt) + Russian word yolka 
NYE tree  associated with Yanokovich 
17 Kryvava yolka Кривава йолка Bloody "yolka" 
18 Shapkokrad Шапкокрад Hat stealer (Cossack game) 
19 Bandito Yanuchito Бандіто Янучіто Outlaw, ref to Yanukovych 
20 Zlatounitazovich Златоунітазович Reference to Yanukovych's golden (zlato) toilets (unitaz)  + ovich 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
21 Yalinkovich Ялинкович 
Reference to holiday tree (yalinka) -gift- from Yanukovych to 
Ukrainian people 
22 Bandiukovich Бандюкович Amalgamation bandits & Yanukovych 
23 Vitka Вітька "Loving" reference to little Victor Yanukovych 
24 Yanek Янек Deliberate misspelling/nickname for Yanuk(ovych) 
25 Yanik Яник Nickname for Yanuk(ovych) 
26 Yanki Янкі Nickname for Yanukovych (Yankee) 
27 Yanni Янні  Nickname for Yanukovych (Yankee) 
28 Yanukovosch Януковощ 
Combination of Yanukovych and vegetable (ovosch), ie not capable 
of thinking 
29 Bandiuk Бандюк Nickname of bandit/ Yanukovych 
30 mudak мудак idiot 
31 ovosch овощ Vegetable 
32 Yanuchar Янучар 
Reference to Yanukovych  as Janissary (Christian youth conscripted 
to serve in Ottoman infantry units, uber powerful btw 16-19c) 
33 Yanichar Яничар Reference to Yanukovych as Janissary (see above) 
34 Yanuchesku Януческу Reference to Yanukovych as Romania’s deposed leader Ceausescu 
35 Yanushesku Янушеску Reference to Yanukovych as Romania’s deposed leader Ceausescu 
36 Khanukovich Янукович-Ханукович Reference to Yanukovych's Jewry, anti-Semitism 
37 Vzhopu В жопу Up your a**, ref to Yanukovych 
38 parasha параша Lowest class (in prison), akin to Pariah, ref to Yanukovych 
39 skazheniye скаженіє Go crazy, crazed 
40 Zaotvyetish За… отвєтіш 
Ukrainian spelling of Russian word otvyet (you will answer for…), 
ref to Yanukovych 
41 Strybatichini Стрибати, чи ні “To jump or not to jump” – spoof on Presidential ad campaign 
42 Mezhihirya Межигір’я Presidential, home -- palatial estate 
43 Mezhiochi Межиочі Between the eyes, want to punch  
44 batya батя Batya, ref to Father, leader Yanukovych 
45 Nevseremos Невсеремось Play on words, to Yanukovych Venceremos – we will win 
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2. UK Parliament-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
46 Bankova Банкова Bankova St, where Presidential offices are located 
47 Proval vladi провал влади Failure of regime 
48 Pravyy sektor Правий Сектор ‘Right Sector’ aka Ukrainian Nationalist party 
49 pravoseki правосеки Nickname for Right Sector-ians 
50 kaznokradi казнокради Embezzlers 
51 koruptsioneri корупціонери Those who are corrupt 
52 kadrova revolutsiya кадрова революція Drastic personnel change, e.g., replacing 10 of 18 Cabinet ministers 
53 zubozhinnya зубожіння 
Impoverishment; ref to result after Tymoshenko’s billboard ad 
campaign costs, e.g., corrupt use of funds 
54 razvod kotyat развод котят Next litter of kittens (breeding same old…) 
55 pakrashchennya пакращення 
Improvements; ref to Azarov’s claim, with telltale "o" spoken as 
Russian "a", deliberate misspelling 
56 zdolati здолати Overcome, subdue 
57 nari нари Prison bench 
58 nardupi нардупи  
Play on words for  amalgamation of narodny (national) deputati 
(delegates) or nardep; changed to dupi (assholes) 
59 Partiya himoroyiv Партія Гімороїв 
Official political "Party of Regions"  (rehioniv)  -PR-changed to 
Party of Hemorrhoids (himoroiv)  
60 nelehitimnist нелегітимність Illegitimacy (reference to govt) 
61 PeRDauni пердауни  Party of Regions  (PR) acronym + Down Syndrome 
62 Natsistskiy demarsh  Нацистський демарш Nazistic Demarche = change in policy, reference to Nazi Germany 
63 Khvoynyy ekstrakt хвойний екстракт Pine cleaner after taking a bath, get rid of ring/stain 
64 krolik кролик Rabbit, reference to PM Yatseniuk 
65 kulyavlob кулявлоб 
Bullet to the forehead, reference to  PM Yatseniuk, what to do with 
those who do not support Maidan 
66 Tiahnibaks Тягнибакс 
Reference to Tiahnibok, political candidate; code named 
Tiahnibucks for allegedly syphoning money for his campaign 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
67 Shokolyadnyy zayets Шоколядний заєць Reference to Poroshenko, ‘Roshen’ candy business 
68 Porokh Порох Literally, dust, reference to Poroshenko 
69 Triholovyy Триголовий 
Three-headed monster (reference to Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, and 
Poroshenko) 
70 Triholovyy Яценюк 
Three-headed monster (reference to Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, and 
Poroshenko) 
71 Triholovyy Тягнибок 
Three-headed monster (reference to Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, and 
Poroshenko) 
72 Triholovyy Порошенко 
Three-headed monster (reference to Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, and 
Poroshenko) 
73 Upyryatnyk Упирятник “Wizard,” ref to those in power temporarily 
74 Dasvidanya Да свіданія! Play on Ex-PM Azirov’s bye (in Russian da svidaniya) 
75 Tritushki Тритушки Play on phrase Titushki (see p 22)  
76 TriMushkateri Три мушкатери 
Three Muscateers (reference to Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, and 
Poroshenko) 
77 Klitsenbok Клиценбок 
Combination of Klichko, Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, jockeying for 
power  
78 Klitsenbok Кличко 
Combination of Klichko, Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, jockeying for 
power  
79 Klitsenbok Яценюк 
Combination of Klichko, Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, jockeying for 
power  
80 Klitsenbok Тягнибок 
Combination of Klichko, Yatseniuk, Tiahnibok, jockeying for 
power  
81 Tribohateri Три богатері Three wealthy men (reference to above) 
82 Triytsya Трійця Trinity (reference to above trio of power players) 
83 Bezvozhdiv Без вождів Without (bad) leaders 
84 Nemamka Не мамка 
Reference to Mama as Yulia Tymoshenko, ex-PM, Presidential 
candidate 
85 Pochesnyy khuligan Почесний хуліган Reference to Romania’s city council hooligan 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
86 Academic kuligan Академічний  хуліган Academic hooligan 
87 Universitet khuliganiv Університет хуліганів University of Hooligans 
88 politichnyy trup Політічний труп Political corpse 
89 Hospidar Госпідар 
Ex-PM Azarov’s special switching o’s to i’s to attempt to speak in 
Ukrainian 
90 Vlada zlodiyiv Влада злодіїв Crooked leadership 
91 Proklati durnolobtsi Проклаті дурнолобці Damned idiots (no brains) 
92 Naivni bevzi Наївні бевзі Naïve jerks 
93 telepni телепні Blockheads 
94 klownadiya клоунадія Buffoonery 
95 Azirovhit Азіров – гіть 
Using Ex-PM Azarov’s wacky pronunciation of vowels… (het’ 
meaning away) Azirov – go away! - Maidan slogan 
96 Obirezhna Обірежна 
Play on Ex-PM Azarov’s mispronunciation of vowels in the word 
‘warning’ (oberezhno)  - Maidan slogan 
97 Bimbove pawle Бімбове поле 
Play on Ex-PM Azarov’s fake bomb notification – ie, warning, 
minefield - Maidan slogan 
3. Anti-Euromaidan Forces-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
98 varvarska варварська Barbarian 
99 kat кат Executioner, hangman 
4. President Putin-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
100 porebriki поребрики Curb bricks, reference Putin: do not advance beyond curb 
101 Pukin Пукін Putin’s a fart (pukati is to fart) 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
102 Putyara Путяра  Nickname for Putin 
103 Putka Путька Nickname for Putin 
104 PTN PNKh ПТН ПНХ Putin (PTN) Go F*** yourself (pidi na khuy, lit., go on a dick) 
105 pidar підар Slang for faggot, ref to Putin homophobia 
106 hivnek гівнєк Dipshit 
107 pidaras підарас 
Ukrainian spelling of Russian word for homo, cunt, 
pansy,  reference to Putin and Yanukovych 
108 vsravsi всравсі Shit your pants, ref to Putin and Yanukovych 
109 Pidysam Підисам First half of Go F*** yourself, ref to Putin and Yanukovych 
110 Putinkhlo Путін х..ло Putin is a dick (politely missing уй of хуйло) 
5. Russia-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 






Reference to infighting between Russian Mafia & Russian 
bureaucrats 
113 ahresori агресорі "Aggressors" = what Ukrainians call Russians 
114 kazli казли Goats, in Russian "o" pronounced "a," reference to stupid people 
115 zhopolchentsi жополченці Reference to pro-Russian fighters opolchentsi + zhopa = asshole 
116 rashisti рашисти Russian Fascist combined = racist 
117 akvafreshi аквафреші 
“Aquafreshies,” reference to the colors of the RU flag (similar to 
Aquafresh toothpaste) 
118 sovok совок Soviet (Muscovite) 
119 vata вата Literally, cotton; ref to "no brains" 
120 vatniki ватніки "Vatnik" is a prison shirt, ref to criminals (Pro-Russians) 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
121 separi сепари Nickname for separatists, jargon 
122 katok каток Steamroller, crushing all in its path  
123 rashizm рашизм Ideology, totalitarian ideology Russia + fascism = ruscism 
6. Ukraine Slogan 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
124 Uvikni Ukrainu Увікни Україну 
Switch on Ukraine – Yanukovych couldn’t correctly pronounce 
"Увімкни" 
125 Yanukovich pidaresht Янукович підарешт Yanukovych is under arrest 
126 Lustratsiya abo kastratsiya Люстрація або кастрація Purge corruption or be castrated! 
127 Chas rozihnati tsiu bandu Час розігнати цю банду Time to disperse this gang 
7. Euromaidan Protester-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
128 orda орда Horde, Mongol/Turk khanate organization 
129 East and West together Схід і захід разом Russia to retreat back to her boundary 
8. Euromaidan Slogan 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
130 Banda het Банда геть Bandits go away! 
131 V mytnyj soyuz puydyosh 
В Митний союз 
пуйдьош 
Play on words: Putin and ydyosh = puydyosh; go join Putin’s 
answer to EU (Customs/Trade Union among Belarus, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan & Russia) 
132 uzbahoysya узбагойся 
Ukrainians negative response to Russian lemur meme “usbagoy” 
(relax), viral in Aug 2013  
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
133 Ne uzbahoyimsya НЕ узбагоїмся 
Ukrainians negative response to Russian lemur meme “usbagoy” 
(relax), viral in Aug 2013  
134 Tayozhenyy Soyuz Тайожний Союз 
First word "Tayozhenyy", adjective "of the taiga" (meaning in 
Siberia, i.e., out there)-- play on Putin created Tamozhennyy 
(Таможенний) or customs/trade union  
135 Diavolnositvatnyk Диявол носить ватник "Devil Wears Prada" reference to the Russian wears a prison shirt 
B. ANTI-EUROMAIDAN TERMS 
1. Euromaidan Protester-related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
1 pribatsanyy прибацаний Slang for stupid, muttonhead 
2 povstansti повстанці Rebels 
3 ukhilyanti ухилянти Draft dodgers 
4 ukhilniki ухильники Draft dodgers 
2. Ukraine-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
5 upir упир Ghouls 
6 urod урод Freak 
7 urodi уроди Freaks 
8 karateli карателі Punishers, what Russians call Ukrainian soldiers 
9 fashistski molodchiki фашистські молодчики Fascist young men 
10 khokhli хохли 
Russians stereotype Ukrainians, ie, the traditional hairstyle of the 
Cossacks (khokhol, singular) 
11 vyshivatniki вишиватники Derivative, reference to Ukrainians (embroidery) 
12 Ukrop Укроп 
Russians call Ukrainians who uphold post-Yanukovich western 
leaning leadership; disparaging 
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13 Novorosiya Новоросія Putin’s campaign name to annex Eastern Ukraine 
14 zapadentsi западенці Westerners 
15 Malorosiya Малороссія  Russia sees Ukraine as "Little Russia" 
16 khokhli хохлі 
What Russians call Ukrainians (derogatory); a khokhol is the 
Cossack hairstyle 
17 hadiv гадів Snakes (Russians call pro-Maidan-ers) 
3. Ukraine Historical-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
18 plebistsit плебісцит Referendum, from Latin, plebiscit 
19 Benderivtsi Бендерівці Putin & Yanukovych's’ deliberate misspelling, on a "bender" 
20 Banderivtsi Бандерівці Reference to those who follow Stepan Bandera, nationalist figure 
21 Banderlohi Бандерлоги Variant of Bandera-inspired actors 
22 papyeryedniki папєрєднікі Azarov’s horrible pronunciation of predecessors (blames them) 
4. Ukraine Organization-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
23 khunta хунта Junta, interim power in Kyiv leadership 
5. West-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
24 Yevrohomo Євро = гомо Russia’s propaganda that Europe is gay 
25 Geyropa ґейропа Gay Europe 
26 yevrohomointegratsia єврогомоінтеграція Euro-homointegration 
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6. Russia Media-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
28 slaboviki слабовики Weak-willed fighters 
29 Maidowni майдауни Maidan supporters (those w/ Down Syndrome) 
30 Maidanuti майдануті Maidan supporters 
31 separatizm сепаратизм Separatism, the efforts to divide Ukraine; means of hybrid war 
32 Mobilizatsiya vbivaye Мобілізація вбиває "Mobilization kills," RU propaganda not to join the Ukrainian forces 
7. Anti-Euromaidan Forces-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
33 prostitushki простітушки Anyone paid to protest for current govt 
8. UK Parliament-related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
34 Fashistskakhunta Фашистська хунта Fascist (Kyivan) junta 
35 banditi бандити "Bandits" - Russia’s reference to any armed opposition forces 
36 bimba бімба 
Ex-PM Azarov’s erroneous use of ‘I’ when calling police to report a 
“bimb” (bomb) on Kyiv’s metro 
37 krovosis кровосісь Ex-PM Azarov mispronounced krovosos (bloodsucker) 
38 bimba бімба Ex-PM Azarov mispronounced bomb, now part of lexicon as "bimb" 
9. UK Special Forces-Related Terms 
S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
39 berkutyata беркутята 
“Berkut” members (Ministry of Internal Affairs) posted to instigate 
protesters 
40 ptashenyata пташенята Little birds, ref to "Berkut" security detail 
41 berkutyata беркутята Those belonging to "Berkut" Internal Affairs unit, riot police 
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S/No. Key Terms Explanation 
42 berkutushki беркутушки Combination Titushka and Berkut actor 
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